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ABSTRACT
This study analyzes local government tradition and decen­
tralization comparatively in France and Turkey with the frame­
work of a historical perspective, particularly with their 
close relation to the state traditions of the two countries.
In France, local governments had been under strict tute­
lage of the central government throughout the centuries. Strong 
state which penetrates into society by eliminating the ele­
ments of civil society stresses upon centralization provoking a 
discourse on "public interest". In France where strong state 
was embodied in the Jacobin principle "The One and Indivisible 
Republic", the Jacobin state elites saw all attempts at decen­
tralization as a challenge to such Republic. Yet, the develop­
ments towards democracy, after the Second World War, brought 
about a decrease in the power of the state elites. Hence, in 
the strenght of the state. In addition to these developments, 
the existence of a feudal tradition made decentralization easy 
in France in the 1980s.
In Turkey, not unlike in France, local governments had 
been under the tutelage of the central government. The Ottoman
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Empire which had no tradition of civil society had not a local 
government tradition. The state elites (so-called Turkish 
Jacobins) in the Republican period stressed on centralization. 
Political elites had been weak vis-a-vis the state elites. 
Decentralization in the 1980s took place in a condition that 
power relations between them had changed in favor of the 
political elites.
-II-
ÖZET
Bu calismanin amacı Fransa ve Türkiye' de yerel yönetim 
geleneğini ve adem-i merkeziyeti tarihsel olarak, özellikle de 
devlet gelenekleriyle i 1iskilendirilerek, karsilastirmali 
olarak incelemektir.
Fransa' da yerel yönetimler yuzyillar boyu merkezi 
husumetin kati vesayeti altinda olmuslardir. Sivil toplum 
kurumlarinin gelişmesini engelleyerek toplumun her alanina 
nufuz eden guciu devlet, "kamu cikari" söyleminden hareketle 
merkeziyetçiliği vurgular. Fransa' da bu, Jacoben bir ilke olan 
"Tek ve Bölünmez Cumhuriyet" sloganinda somutlasmistir. Ama 
ikinci Dünya Savasindan sonra demokratikleşme lehindeki 
gelişmeler devlet seçkinlerinin gucunu, dolayisiyla devletin 
gucIulugunu görece azaltti. Bu değişmeler, arti feodal bir 
geleneğin olmasi Fransa' da 1980 lerde yapilan adem-i 
merkeziyet reforralarinin basarisini mümkün kildi.
Türkiye'de de, Fransa'daki gibi, yerel yönetimler, merkezi 
yonjstimin vesayeti altinda olmuslardir. Sivil Toplum geleneğine 
sahip olmayan Osmanli imparatorluğu yerel yönetim geleneğine de 
sahip değildi. Cumhuriyet Döneminde sözde Türk Jacobenleri olarak
-III-
adlandirabilecegimiz devlet seçkinleri merkeziyetçiliği vurgu- 
luyorlardi.„.Bunlara karsin siyasal seçkinler daha gucsuz durum- 
daydilar. 1980 lerde Türkiye'de yapilan kismi adem-i merkeziyet 
reformlari bu guc dengesinin siyasal seçkinler lehine değiştiği 
bir ortamda ancak gerçekleşmiştir.
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INTRODUCTION
During the 1980s Turkish society has experienced important 
social, political, economic, and cultural changes. Liberal 
economic policies have been introduced emphasizing market 
forces and market values transforming import substitution 
strategy to export- led industrialization. These trends were 
reinforced by the privatization programs which aimed to de­
crease the role of the state in the economy and society in 
general. One of the most important changes was the reinforce­
ment of the local governments, especially municipalities, by 
giving more rights and competence to them. These developments, 
privatization and decentralization in Turkey, coincided with 
parallel developments in Western Europe. In the post- 1980 
period many of the Western European countries ■ have undergone 
some decentralization experiences. Decentralization has become 
a general trend throughout the world along with some other 
policies which aimed to decrease the role of the state in the 
society. It became a general and accepted way of resolving the 
administrative, and political problems of centralization.
One crucial indicator of decentralization is the share of 
the local government in public expenditure. From this particu­
lar perspective, for instance, it is claimed that West European
governments have grown and decentralized with the relative 
decline of the center in terms of the public expenditures. In 
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany (FR), 
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, United King­
dom, and USA the share of the local government in general 
government expenditure· has increased during the post-war 
period.^
Turkey introduced local government decentralization in the 
post-1980 period by creating a two-tier metropolitan municipal 
system. This was an important break from earlier practices 
because the Ottoman-Turkish political tradition was highly 
centralized and had no tradition of civil society or intermedi­
ary institutions between the state and society.^By creating a 
new metropolitan municipal system, more resources and authority 
were given to the municipalities and the tutelage^ which was 
previously exercised by central government had begun to be 
exercised by metropolitan municipalicies-in reality by a metro­
politan mayor.
In France, local government vas decentralized with the 
act of March 2 1982. With this lav, the executive power was 
transferred from prefects who were centrally appointed members 
exercising tutelage over local authorities to the elected 
presidents, and the prefects were abolished. After the reforms, 
all a priori tutelage of the prefects had disappeared. Local 
government activities have come to be placed under ^ posteriori
legal and financial control.^ In France, a genuine local gov­
ernment was created. A genuine local government means that 
locally elected authorities have the right to make decisions on 
local issues and implement policies without prior permission of 
the central government. In Turkey, on the other hand, decen­
tralization stopped at the metropolitan municipality level. In 
three major urban centers (Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara) a new 
metropolitan municipality system was created after 1983. 
Metropolitan municipality is made up of a metropolitan munici­
pality and district municipalities. The tutelage, exercised 
previously by the central government, was transferred to the 
metropolitan municipality. I believe, the extent and success of 
decentralization is closely related to the political culture 
of a society and especially to the extent that there has been a 
strong state. In this study, political culture means more than 
just the patterns of political behaviour. It refers to the 
subjective orientation of nations, social groups and individu­
als to politics. It is a set of attitudes, beliefs and senti­
ments which give order and meaning to a political system. In 
fact central-local government relations of a country can not be 
understood without looking at the political culture, especially 
at the state tradition, because such a relationship has been 
established throughout a certain period of time within a par­
ticular political and social context. In the societies where 
state emerged as a strong and autonomous agent, decentraliza­
tion has been a difficult task because in such societies the 
state imposes norms to maintain its autonomy vis-a-vis the 
intermediaries between the state and society.
In both France and Turkey there has been a strong state 
tradition but in Turkey the state has been stronger than in 
France. In this study the strong state refers to a state which 
successfully penetrates to all spheres of a society by elimi­
nating intermediaries between itself and society. Within this 
theoretical framework which was developed by Theda Skocpol, 
Kenneth Dyson and Metin Heper, the state is taken as an inde­
pendent agent that has its own logic and norms independent 
from the norms of the people and society in general.® First of 
all, it is necessary to define centralization, decentraliza­
tion and other concepts that will be used in this study. Decen­
tralization and centralization are two concepts that refer to 
geographic relationships in terms of the division of powers 
between and among levels of government or hierarchical rela- 
tionship within levels of government. In a broader sense, 
decentralization is defined as "... the transfer of planning, 
decision making, or administrative authority, from central 
government to field organizations,., or local governmental
Oorganizations". Centralization and decentralization represent 
a continuum rather than a dichotomy and can take different 
forms.
Three types of decentralization are defined in the litera­
ture. First one is déconcentration which means the passing of 
some authority or responsibility to a lower level within the 
central government machinery. In addition to the executive.
local officials have also discretion to plan and implement 
programs. This is an important step towards decentralization in 
highly centralized political systems. Second process is dele- 
gation which means the transfer of responsibility for specific 
functions to the agents that are outside of the central bureau­
cratic structure. These agents can be some public corporations, 
regional development agencies, and other agencies, either 
public or private. The rationale behind this is to increase 
efficiency and to make some jobs outside the central bureaucra­
cy which delays the fulfillment of the functions. The last one 
is devolution which means creation of subnational units of the 
governments which are financially and legally more powerful 
regarding, the activities which are outside the direct control
Qof central government. The ideal form of decentralization is 
the one where there is local autonomy whidh means that locally 
elected bodies have the right to паке decisions and plans 
without prior permission of central government.
In every kind of political system there exists a kind of 
decentralization, such as the simple delegation of some func­
tions to the agents that are administered by a centrally ap­
pointed person. This means that a pure and ideal-typical cen­
tralized system does not exist in reality. Local government 
is a unit of government in which an elected agent fulfills some 
functions at the localities. The form of local government 
varies among countries based on their social and political 
traditions. Concerning the central-local government relations 
we can distinguish three kinds of relationships. These are
political, administrative, and fiscal or financial relation­
ships.^® Administrative relationship between central and local 
government has a political dimension which is exercised as 
tutelage. Even in the Anglo-Saxon tradition which gives the 
local government the greatest autonomy, there is a certain kind 
of central control and supervision over local governments. 
Especially in democratic countries where multi-party politics 
is in function, local government gains political character. In 
the centralized traditions central government tries to control 
local government in order to maintain the local government as 
the units of central government at the localities. This has 
been the case in T u r k e y . I n  regards to political relationship 
it is clear that local governments are politicized units which 
mobilize people. Therefore the central government, which is 
also, a political entity made up of a political party or coali­
tion has some interest in local government. Especially partisan 
considerations come into the scene within this dimension. If 
local government is in the hands of opposition, which is a 
common case in Turkey, resources are distributed by such con­
siderations. Also central government by decreasing the re­
sources can influence the financial situation and in many 
countries local governments are dependent on central govern­
ments regarding their financial needs.
The present study aims at analyzing the phenomenon of 
local government and decentralization in France and Turkey. In 
the first chapter a general theoretical framework that this
study dwells upon will be discussed. It includes an elaboration 
of the concept of the "strong state" which is used to define 
different polities on the bases of its ability to prevent the 
development of the civil societal elements vis-a-vis the state. 
In this chapter, the state in the French and Turkish contexts 
is covered.
The second chapter deals with local government in the 
French political context. Local government in France has been 
under strict central control and decentralization was con­
sidered as a direct threat to the national unity. Despite this 
fact, decentralization has been a major concern of French 
political and administrative elites. Nevertheless, only during 
the Socialist period a genuine local government decentraliza­
tion reform was undertaken. This chapter analyzes local govern­
ment tradition and the socialist decentralization.
The third chapter dwells upon the local government tradi­
tion in the Ottoman-Turkish context. Local government in Turkey 
does not have a long tradition. Its rudiment forms took place 
by the end of the nineteenth century. The Turkish Republic did 
not inherit a strong local government tradition, whereas, it 
operated in a centralized fashion. Local governments in Turkey 
faced serious fiscal, and political crisis. The third chapter 
analyzes these developments as well as the reforms of the 
1980s.
The fourth chapter is about the comparison of local gov-
eminent traditions and decentralization in France and Turkey. 
It aims to find the principal reasons behind two different 
paths of evolutions of local governments in these countries. 
The state in France favored the developments of civil socie­
tal groups, thus, aimed to close the gap between civil 
society and itself. Therefore, the French political elites 
radically changed the role of the state at the periphery by 
abolishing all kinds of tutelage, whereas in Turkey the decen­
tralization reforms remained partial and limited.
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CHAPTER I
THE STRONG STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DECENTRALIZATION:
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
I. State Traditions in France and Turkey
A distinction is made between the strong state and the 
weak state in the literature. As Heper mentions "... in some 
polities public interest means more than the sum of private or 
group interests. From this particular perspective we can talk 
about the phenomenon of the state ... which reflects a notion 
of public interest with little affinity to sectional 
interests".^ The constitutive agents of the public interest are 
governmental leaders and/or public officials which are state 
elites and are different from governmental political elites. 
State elites are the guardians of public interest which is 
derived from intrinsic public needs; political elites are the 
elected representatives of the people and are accountable to 
them.^
States elites do not take into account private interests, 
namely the interests of the people and of private groups in 
implementation of policies, rather they base their actions on
11
the notion of the public interest which, in itself, is a state 
norm guiding the actions of the state elites. This has some 
important consequences for the liberal democracies. In the
fi'
societies where the state has been a strong one unelected 
institutions has been important in the resolution of conflicts. 
For instance, in England, where the state is weak, the parlia­
ment is above all other institutions, whereas, in France where 
the state is strong other institutions are influential. For 
example the president has a critical position in French politi­
cal system. In Germany, which has a similar state tradition 
Constitutional Court is an influencial institution via-a-vis 
the parliament. The state norms from which the notion of the 
public interest is derived come from some critical and general 
policy issues, for example from foreign policy, development and 
modernization projects, and if these factors are effective in a 
polity we can talk about "stateness". The stateness is not 
fixed and varies from polity to polity and in a given polity 
regarding different periods.^
The capacity of a society to create consensus in the resolu­
tion of fundamental conflicts and major claims, and its abili­
ty to reconcile sectional interests was the most significant 
determinant of variations of Western European states. If there 
is no such consensus there exists an autonomous state.
Concerning the capacity of a society to create consensus
in the resolution of fundamental conflicts brings us to dif-
0
ferent points of departure. Within this context, Heper distin­
12
guishes among centralized feudalism, decentralized feudalism 
and patrimonia 1 ism or personal rule.'^ In centralized and 
decentralized feudalisms there exist some countervailing powers 
which challenges the power of the center but in patrimonialism, 
center penetrates to every sphere of the society, thus, the 
periphery is totally dominated by the center. Centralized 
feudalism is characterized by the successful resolution of 
conflicts between central and local authority structures. 
Medieval England provides a good example of centralized feudal­
ism. English kings and barons which were local forces upheld 
each other's rights. In the fourteenth, century the conflict of 
the central and local authority structures was resolved, and no 
war had taken place between them. As a result, consensus 
emerged as a legitimate way of resolution of conflicts and the 
state turned out a weak one.^
France, on the other hand, is the best example of a decen­
tralized feudalism where there was continuous wars between the 
king and the local grandees in the ninth and tenth centuries. 
Even in the late eighteenth century, the conflict was not 
resolved with consensus and this continuous conflict prevented 
the development of consensus as a method for progressive reso­
lution of fundamental claims. Therefore, there emerged a strong 
state which has been an influential actor in politics.®
For patrimonialism, Ottoman Empire is an ideal example. 
Here patrimonialism or personal rule briefly refers to a 
polity in which there exists a ruler and all spheres of life
13
are dominated by the center, made up of those who act on 
behalf of the ruler, without intermediaries. People are mere 
subjects of the ruler without having a place in government. 
Unlike in centralized and decentralized feudalisms where there 
were some countervailing powers who checked the central author­
ity, in Ottoman patrimonialism periphery was totally pene­
trated by the center.^ All lands belonged to the sultan and 
landed aristocracy could not develop. Unlike the European 
middle classes who transformed their economic power into polit­
ical one, in Ottoman S'Mciety, the local notables who emerged 
due to weakness of the center never transformed their economic 
power into political power. Hence, no share of power had taken 
place between the local notables and the sultan which meant, in 
turn, the total absence of the civil society. Republican state 
elites inherited this kind of tradition which emphasizes a 
barrier to the legitimation of an autonomous civil society.
II. State Traditions and Decentralization in Prance and
Turkey
Both France and Turkey have a strong state tradition 
whereas the state in the Ottoman-Turkish context is stronger 
than France in the sense that there were no intermediary groups 
or institutions in the Ottoman-Turkish context. The Ottoman
state, established by qhasis (The Ottoman warriors), was a 
militant entity which in turn shaped the political culture. In 
this process state was based on the idea of conquest. Hence the
14
. . . . . . ftmilitary was an important factor in establishing the state. 
Consequently, law and order as a norm of state was emphasized. 
The Ottoman statesman strived to save the state from internal 
and external enemies. This led to constant, and often exagger­
ated, fear of anarchy, rebellion, and treason.^ Therefore, in 
the Ottoman tradition the development of the local forces as 
autonomous agents vis-a-vis the state became impossible. Due 
to the lack of the peripheral forces the idea of civil society 
was alien to Ottoman polity. There was an idea of supreme law 
(yasa/yasak) which meant that ruler had to act’ with the crite­
ria of "equity" and "justice" without personal wishes. Govern­
ment was not based on personal wishes of the sultan but on the 
"necessity" and "reason" which led to a state oriented tradi­
tion. The norms which developed as a consequence of this tradi­
tion were called adab■and they were newly adopted norms 
formulated independently of civil societal e l e m e n t s . T h e  
state elites used these norms and values for their personal 
aims.
The basic cleavage in the Ottoman society was the center- 
periphery cleavage.The center was made up of all the bureau­
cratic state elites with their distinct culture, a different 
type of language, style of wear, whereas the periphery was made 
up of the rest of the people who did not belong to the bureau- 
cratic elite. Periphery was subordinated by the center and 
they had no influence over it. Local notables who were a polit­
ically influential group constituted neither the influential 
aristocracy nor the nobility before the nineteenth century."
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Their participation in administration was not permanent and 
when their influence was increased, center replaced them with 
central agents.
During the nineteenth century, the center's attitude towards 
the periphery did not change and all the modernization prac­
tices during this period aimed to strengthen the center 
itself.They were against the devolution of power and au­
thority to local notables. With the Senedi Ittifak (Deed of 
Alliance) of 1808 local notables gained some authority but 
Tanzimat period marked the beginning of a center-periphery 
conflict once again.Tanzimat was an attempt of the center to 
penetrate into the periphery more systematically. It brought a 
new, potentially conflicting situation, because during the 
earlier period some functions had been delegated to local 
notables and now center aimed to get rid of the intermediaries 
between the center and its subjects. The motive behind this 
was to mobilize the masses against the local notables. Before 
Tanzimat civil bureaucrats were mere servants of the sultan 
acting on behalf of him. But with Tanzimat. civil bureaucrats 
aspired for the status of the state elites. They cut their ties 
with the sultan and their primary aim became the preservation 
of their autonomy. One point that should be made here is that 
the bureaucratic elites during this time viewed themselves as 
the servant of the state and not of the Sultan. They de­
veloped a kind of rationality which gave the state a mystic 
conception, being above all the interest of the people.
16
The same tradition continued during the Republican period. 
The founder of the Republic, Atatürk, was particularly inter­
ested in the adab tradition and his policy was directed to 
establish a nation- state which belonged to the people. 
However, the Republican elites did not make any significant 
change in the basic cleavage structure. Periphery was totally 
dominated by the center and could not have a place in the 
government. Moreover, after Atatürk, bureaucratic elites stayed 
in power and they turned Ataturkism into an official ideology 
to be preserved by them. Political parties were established due 
to the conflicts among elites. For instance the founders of the 
Democrat Party were previously the members of the Republican 
Peoples' Party. When periphery identified itself with a party 
and came to power in 1960, military intervened. The center 
was dominant and almost in all military interventions we can 
see the influence of the conflict between the center and the 
periphery, namely, the conflict between the military bureau­
cratic elites representing the public interest and the politi­
cal elites representing the interest of the people.
France too has a strong and autonomous state tradition. 
Throughout the centuries, the conflict between the center and 
the local authority structures were not resolved by the use of 
consensus, and the state emerged as an agent that set ideologi­
cal parameters which constituted a normative base for the 
legitimation of the actions of the state in shaping the polity 
of the society. For instance, until the last few decades na­
17
tionalism had been more important than democracy. In France, 
where a decentralized feudalism existed in the ninth and tenth 
centuries there was a tug of war between the king and the local 
grandees, which culminated in the absolute rule of Louis XIV 
(1643-1715). As Dyson wrote;
"French represents a case of institu­
tional concentration. The bureaucracy is the reposi­
tory of the state tradition. Consequently France's 
constitutional and political development after 1789 
has been one of persistent antagonism between repre­
sentative institutions (emphasizing the role of the 
deputy and distrust of public authority) and the 
idea of the State, with periods when the representa­
tive system has been limited or even suspended. 
Political parties have traditionally been seen in 
negative terms as spokesman of interests and ideolo­
gies rather than as providing leadership for the 
executive power. The state tradition has been 
associated with the idea of a zone authority inde­
pendent of the Assembly and parties and interest 
groups (the so-called "intermediaries"). De Gaulle's 
intention to turn the French State into a "decisive, 
ambitious and an active institution serving only 
national interest" found its expression in bureau­
cratic reforms.... and in controlled parliamentary 
system of the Fifth Republic".^®
18
with the reforms, civil service became a major representative 
of the idea of the state and their position was strengthened. 
They were protecting the autonomy of the administrative system. 
The result was the emergency of a strong and centralized state.
In the nineteenth century, French society witnessed 
serious social and political upheavals due to violent political 
and social transformations. When these transformations were 
taking place, the state appeared as a medium of practically 
unsolvable contradictions, thus, the state struggled to be 
stable during these upheavals. Under such conditions, consensus 
did not become a way of the resolution of conflicts. Conse­
quently, the state tried to protect itself from social and 
political conflicts by creating autonomous institutions to 
which only those who passed through a selection process (com­
petitive examinations) based on merit were admitted.These 
institutions posed professional norms and values which were 
particularly expressed in terms of the ideology of general 
interest. Hence, the state became an autonomous above-classes' 
type of an institution. The aim was to divorce the civil serv­
ants from their class origins. They became royal spokesman for 
the state. They identified themselves with the state on the 
bases of the idea of public service which was considered as the 
unique instrument of public p o w e r . T h e  civil servants tended 
to see the state and government as distinct domains. They acted 
as the guardians of the state and state interest. During the
19
1950s, the situation was not different from the end of the 
nineteenth century. All of the initiatives of De Gaulle and the 
Gaullist administrators aimed at reinforcement of the central 
administration and the executive by eliminating the parliament 
and intermediaries between the state and the people.
Although during the Gaullist period the state was overin­
stitutionalized, the mobilization of the people became a neces­
sity in order to make the required changes to ensure social and 
economic modernization. It was due to this need that at the end 
of the 1960s, the state wanted the reinforcement of the pri­
vate groups signifying a decrease of state power. It is in this 
context, as Ezra N. Suleiman claims, that it is not possible to 
understand the French society without paying attention to the 
developments in the state- society r e l a t i o n s . A f t e r  the 
Second World War, French society became a modern industrial 
society. During this process it had become clear that an inter­
action was occurring between the state and civil society which 
was so complex that could not be understood with reference to 
the centralized state. In fact, private groups in French poli­
tics had become a normal phenomenon. One indicator of the 
changes in state-society relations was the development of the 
interest groups in French politics which showed that a dia­
logue between the state elites and private groups was occur­
ring. xMthough the rhetoric of the civil servants was not to 
engage in a genuine dialogue with these groups, growing inter­
action meant a reciprocal power relationship between the civil 
servants and interest groups that at the end diminished the
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power of the state by tolerating sectional interests. Paral­
lel developments that at the end diminish the power of the 
state has taken place in the relations between the local au­
thorities and civil servants or central authorities. Many local 
authorities found legal or illegal ways of bypassing the formal 
procedures and rules which resulted in an informal decentrali­
zation. This was one of the significant factors that made 
decentralization easy and successful. In brief, due to economic 
modernization and social mobilizaton there emerged a need for 
decentralization during the Gaullist period -or more general in 
the postwar period.
In comparison to the French state, the Ottoraan-Turkish 
state had been stronger. As Heper pointed out, the interest 
groups had played a more significant role in French polity 
than they had in Turkey. During the 1980s the state-interest 
groups relations display signs of monism signifying the absence 
of pluralism in the state- society re la tions.French state 
had less autonomy vis-a-vis the civil society than state in the 
Ottoman-Turkish context. Unlike in Turkey, the state in France 
intended to narrow the gap between itself and the civil socie­
ty. In France, democracy was taken as a means whereas in Turkey 
it was taken as an end in itself. Decentralization was nothing 
more than an attempt to narrow the gap in question in France.
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CHAPTER II
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TRADITION AND DECENTRALIZATION IN
FRANCE
I. The Local Government in France
France as a unitary and centralized society is consid­
ered a prototype of centralization. In fact Paris is not only 
a political but also an economic, cultural, and intellectual 
center. French state was established by the'Jacobins who have 
been the supporters of centralization since the French Revolu­
tion. Louis Napoleon further centralized the French political 
and administrative system. The rationale behind centralization 
was to maintain the "national unity" and "uniformity" which 
were the norms and values of the Revolution, In fact, since the 
French Revolution of 1789, "national unity' has been the pri­
mary issue of conflict between the supporters of centralization 
and decentralization. The supporters of centralization saw any 
attempt toward decentralization as a threat to national unity 
in the sense that decentralization could destroy the unity of 
the nation.^ Therefore, they insisted that the centralized 
system must be maintained. The supporters of decentralization, 
on the other hand, claimed that a centralized system was an
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obstacle to local autonomy and democracy, thus, introducing 
decentralization was necessary to have a local democracy and a 
genuine local government.
Although France is a centralized country and only in the 
1980s a genuine and radical decentralization program was intro­
duced, the debate about decentralization goes to the early 
period of the Republic which begins with the French Revolution. 
Therefore it is necessary to trace the history of local govern­
ment through certain historical periods. Before undertaking 
this task, I will introduce the structure and organization of 
local government in France. The following part focuses on the 
structure of local government which was at work before the 
socialist reform in 1981.
Local government in France, today, is organized at three 
levels: regional, departmental, and communal. At the base there 
are communes and their number is about thirty six thousand, 
with the population ranging from one million to fever numbers. 
These are governed by elected mayors and they have communal 
councils. Above these communes there are general councils for 
ninety five departments. They are directly elected but until 
recent reforms they had no executive of their own. The regional 
councils are made up of indirectly elected members from the 
communes and departments including local deputies (members of 
parliament) and senators.^ The regions are the creation of the 
Fifth Republic and the present form was shaped subsequently in 
1964, 1972 and 1982. The departments were created in 1789. The 
communes also date from 1789 but they are based on the struc­
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ture of the ancien regime. The relationship between these 
levels is considered, in principle, as not hierarchical. But 
in reality there is some duplication, competition, and even 
rivalry. The most powerful local authority in relation to 
decision making is the commune and the weakest is the region.^ 
The crucial actor between central government and local 
government is the prefect who gives its distinguishing charac­
teristics to the French local government system. A prefect is a 
centrally appointed member who exercises tutelage power over 
the local authorities. The prefectural system was created in 
1800 by Napoleon. Due to unstable political history of France, 
centralization became the apparatus of the elites to maintain 
national unity. The solution was the establishment of the 
Napoleonic prefectural system which, as Ridley noted, re­
flected the belief that all political issues were national and 
to be decided by national government which was located in Paris 
and therefore, there should be no local government in France 
but only local administration.^ Hayward noted the following:
" Napoleon used Roman title of pre­
fect to describe the "mini-emperors" who were to 
rule the departments as his agents, mobilize the 
local resources for the central government purposes, 
and ensure universal obedience to his will. The 
prefect was to be a local leader, restoring consen­
sus after successive revolutionary crisis, imposing 
the changes dictated by his Paris masters, acting as 
an electoral agent for the parties in power, exer­
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cising a paternalistic despotism over the department 
allocated to him".^
Prefect is also the representative of the government in the 
department and he supervises and co-ordinates the work of the 
field services of the Paris ministries. He ensures that laws 
and governmental directives are implemented. He is also the 
main agent of the Ministry of Interior in the department and he 
supervises all field services of the ministry responsible for 
the maintenance of law and order. He can ban a film, a demon- 
stration, and organize local elections. The prefect is an 
appointed member representing central authority at the local 
level. Hence, the prefectural system implies delegation and 
centralization in the sense that some central functions are 
transferred without autonomy. In the post-war period and
before the socialist reforms in 1981, there were three kinds of 
tutelage over local authorities exercised by the prefect. 
The first one was administrative tutelage which was exercisec^ 
by the prefect over the decisions of local authorities. The 
second type of tutelage was financial tutelage exercised in 
principle by the prefect but in reality by the Finance Minis­
try, and the third one was technical tutelage in various forms 
imposing model norms or actions prepared within central minis­
tries.^ The radical dimension of the socialist reform is due to 
the abolishment of the prefects and all a priori tutelages, a 
critical heritage of the French political culture.
Despite the successive waves of decentralization through- 
c.'it the history that will be explained below, the position of
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the center remained very powerful in France. One source of the 
central power is the statutory weakness of the local authori­
ties vis-a-vis the centrally appointed members. For instance, 
if a local authority wants to borrow money, add a new tax or 
change the base of an existing one, central authorities can 
intervene. In the past, interventions in such cases were 
common and they in turn weakened local government.®
II. The Historical Development of Local Government in
France
Administration during the Roman Empire supported municipal 
autonomy to a considerable extent. Bureaucratic centralization 
developed later. Under the feudal system there was again a 
decline,in centralization but when the king regained power 
over the lords, the tendency toward centralization increased 
and from the fourteenth century onwards the autonomy of locali­
ties was gradually destroyed and this trend continued with
gLouis the XIV. The French Revolution had a major impact on 
the development of local government in France.
Focusing on the Revolution paves the way to explain the 
successive developments, especially the issue of why only twice 
in the political and administrative history of France decen­
tralization reform was successful and various attempts resulted 
in failure. French Revolution set the parameters of the legis­
lative debate on decentralization conceptually and institution­
ally. First of all, the French Revolution fixed the terms of
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the debate because it formulated the primary question regard­
ing decentralization as "to what extent are the requirements of 
national unity and the dictates of principles of equality 
before the law compatible with local liberty". Since the Revo­
lution of 1748, all issues of decentralization has been related 
to the disintegration of national unity. The articulation of 
the national unity and decentralization in such a manner had 
produced destructive results for local autonomy. For example, 
when for the first time the universal suffrage was introduced 
in the second half of the nineteenth century, it did not extend 
to the local leaders because it was considered as a threat to 
the unity of the nation. When it was extended towards local 
authorities (in 1884 for communes) the tutelage power became a 
means of control of the center over the local governments to 
ensure such unity. The election of mayors of the region^ was 
considered a threat for national democracy. In short, the 
center assumed that there was an opposition between unity and 
equality on the one hand and local liberty on the other. There­
fore the French Revolution ensured that national democracy 
comes first and local democracy second.^® Secondly, the Revolu­
tion determined the institutional context within which all 
future reforms were confined in. The Revolution created a new 
institutional structure in which the "republican" communes and 
departments became royal provinces. Although the national 
government's structure has been changed, the local government's 
structure remained the same. New institutions were created but 
this did not change the basic structure.Thirdly, after the 
French Revolution political interests operated stronger than
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the political principles in relation to decentralization. 
Although principally local liberty was supported, due to the 
pragmatic opposition to decentralization and being in time of 
crisis, it could not be realized. Opposition groups or parties 
were supporting decentralization but when they came to power 
they saw that centralization could increase their power, thus 
they did not implement their policies.For instance, Ezra N. 
Suleiman noted that although there has been a need for decen­
tralization in all periods it could not be realized. The reason 
was that the system worked to the advantage of a small group 
civil servants who aimed to enter into political arena. Accord­
ing to the existing, law someone can be a member of the parlia­
ment and occupy a high position in the bureaucracy at the same
• 1 0  , ,time. At the beginning of the French Revolution there was a 
trend of decentralization. But later, the political principle 
gave way to pragmatism of those who, once in power, saw their 
political interests furthered by continuing or even, increasing 
governmental centralization. Recentralization came with the 
Jacobins, and then with the Directory, and then with Napoleon 
and their centralized system continued until the 1815 restora­
tion. With the 1848 revolution, decentralization was introduced 
for a short time but it was replaced by a highly centralized 
system of the Second Empire. This ended in another crisis in 
1370 with the National Defense government.^^  A successful 
decentralization reform was introduced only during the Third 
Republic.
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Girondins, as a counter front, supported decentralization 
by claiming the election of local authorities by universal 
suffrage because their support was in the countryside and v/ith 
decentralization they could control the periphery and limit 
the power of the Jacobins. But the Jacobins highly centralized 
the system and for them it was only a way to control the coun­
try and maintain themselves in power. They claimed that cen­
tralization became a way to cope with the enemies outside and 
inside the country. It was an expression of the general v;ill 
because it represented the will of the people through universal 
suffrage but decentralization would fragment it in its constit­
uent parts. It is also understandable why the Jacobins were so 
much against decentralization; since they were stronger in the 
center rather than the periphery, decentralization meant a loss 
of power. In 1793, the Jacobins took away the power of the 
departments. Hence, the elected authorities were replaced with 
government appointed agents. All efforts of the Jacobins aimed 
to make local governmental agents subordinate to the central 
government.
After the decline of the Jacobins, with the Constitution 
of Five Fructidor in 1795 a two-tier system of voting was 
established. Municipal elections were done by universal suf­
frage restricted to men but departmental elections were subject 
to second level elections in which the candidates were chosen 
on the criteria of property. This was an attempt to avoid the 
problems created by mayors' dual role as a representative of 
the state and as an executive organ of the commune. With this
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arrangement the mayors lost the status of the representative of 
the state and also the power that came with it. The power of 
the commi7.arie who were appointed by the government to super­
vise the mayor or local government in general was strengthened.
During the Napoleonic era we come across a high level of 
centralization. According to Vivien Schmidt, Napoleon success­
fully achieved what Jacobins could not. During the period 
between 1799 and 1800, a law was instituted which presupposed 
that all communes were to have a mayor and a municipal council. 
By this law the prefectural system was created and the prefect 
began to choose the mayors, and deputy mayors in communes with 
5000 inhabitants. He also had the power to suspend the mayor, 
deputy mayors and municipal councils, and tutelage power over 
the decisions of communes. During this period, universal 
suffrage remained symbolic without any true effect and prefect 
was a key level of government in the periphery.
Between 1825 and 1830 the same system was at work but it 
should be noted that there was a debate in favor of decentrali­
zation. Under the July Monarchy between 1830 and 1848 there 
were some changes in the system although not structural. The 
mayor continued to be appointed by the central government and 
the prefect was a key actor in the p e r i p h e r y . T h e  1848 
Revolution and the Second Republic which was short lived intro­
duced a limited amount of decentralization. Universal suffrage 
became effective for local elections. Prefectural corps were 
abolished and replaced with commissaires de la repubiiaue.
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However this did not mean the total abolishment of tutelage but 
its weakening for a short time until the intervention of Louis
Napoleon,17
Under the Second Empire, prefects extended their role as 
executives of departments. 1852 constitution gave prefects the 
right to appoint the mayor even from the outside municipal 
council. The central government could also dissolve the munici­
pal council uncil the next elections. During this period the 
power of the prefect increased and tutelage was reinforced. 
Still, in this period, a set of debates on decentralization 
took place. There were some proposals which aimed at decentral­
ization or centralization from different fronts. But in prac­
tice there were no important changes.
It must be noted that before the Third Republic, especial­
ly during the Paris commune in 1871, the extreme left was 
completely behind decentralization. Since they were against 
imperial and monarchical centralization, decentralization meant 
local democracy, autonomy and protest against such centraliza­
tion. The Paris Commune was defeated and the Third Republic 
was established in 1871. A successful decentralization reform 
before the period of the Socialist Fifth Republic was only 
introduced during the Third Republic. Therefore it is neces­
sary to look ar this period in more detail. The beginning of 
the Third Republic ended the pattern which was at work for 
nearly a century: all reforms of decentralization was followed 
by a successive process of recentralization. At the beginning
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of the Third Republic there was a policy shift regarding decen­
tralization. It started with the 1871 regulation which was 
followed by another one in 1877. In 1884 the Organic Law on 
municipal decentralization was instituted which increased the 
role of the mayor vis-a-vis the prefect. The reforms of 1871 
and 1884 theoretically gave wide powers to the elected councils 
and communal councils who gained the right to choose their 
mayors. Although there was some delegation of certain func­
tions to local government agencies, only few larger urban 
centers developed local government functions and services as 
others were small and resources were not e n o u g h . W i t h  the 
1884 Organic Law it was supposed that by the authority of the 
prefect, mayor could be suspended only for one month and the 
suspension more than this time necessitated the intervention of 
Interior Ministry. This meant, to a certain extent, the 
reduction of tutelage. Although there was still a prefect with 
the tutelage power over mayor's administrative and financial 
decisions, now mayor as a representative of the state due to 
his dual role could have direct control of the state. Despite 
the tutelage, mayor was responsible for the publication and 
execution of law and regulations. This law set the parameters 
for the local governments especially at the communal level for 
the successive periods because it remained in effect with some 
minor modifications until the socialist decentralization in 
1981.
In the parliament, during the Third Republic, center-left 
was supporting decentralization because it was the only way to
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limit the power of conservative majority in the parliament. 
Therefore, as Schmidt said, this support was a result of prag­
matic political calculation.^^ At this time, the answer to the 
fundamental question of "how much local liberty was compatible 
with national unity and equality before the law" was more in 
favor of local liberty. Especially the left thought that a 
reasonable measure of local liberty was compatible with local 
democracy. Most of the parties of the right also supported 
decentralization for similar pragmatic considerations. But they 
based their arguments more on political principles. In reality 
the right was the majority in the Assembly and at that time 
there were new actors in the scene. Proletariat was a revolu­
tionary force. There were also shopkeepers as a significant 
force if they were to ally with other classes. Peasantry was 
also an effective section in the society. The alliance between 
peasantry and aristocracy was a threat to the Republic. There­
fore, given this composition it was a reasonable solution for 
the right to gain the support of the peasantry. Decentraliza­
tion would guarantee this support. The only group that was 
against decentralization was the Bonapartist extreme right,- 
those who thought that decentralization would be a great threat 
to national unity because it would create many small republics 
in a national republic
Although, after these reforms, there was not a significant 
practical attempt for decentralization, administrative debate 
on decentralization was a common concern in the parliament.
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Almost all groups supported decentralization but the content of 
decentralization was limited and defined with efficiency rather 
than local autonomy and democracy. Decentralization was taken 
as a way to simplify administration, and financial aspects came 
into perspective. Since the parliament was in trouble in the 
1890s, the prefectural system appeared as a way to balance the 
budget and to decrease the financial burden of the periphery.
As an informal aspect, with the increase of professionali­
zation of the civil service, the expansion of the field serv­
ices of the state and the modernization of the economy in­
creased centralization but this was accompanied with the grow­
ing of local government and the development of mutual relation­
ships between the prefect and the local notables which gave 
more autonomy to the local elected officials informally.
During the Vichy regime there were some radical breaks 
from the tradition of the Third Republic. With the laws of 1940 
and 1942 mayors were appointed. One of the most important 
contribution of the Vichy Regime was that it established re­
gions and created a regional prefect. This meant regional 
decentralization but after the war the situation changed.
The Fourth Republic also witnessed important debates on 
administrative reform. Parallel to these debates, the content 
of decentralization was also changing. It gained wider meaning 
including more financial and administrative autonomy, increas­
ing the mayor's executive power and transferring it from the
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prefect to the mayor. Although the definition of decentraliza­
tion gained a new and broader meaning, the reforms remained 
quite narrov.·. But there was a need for decentralization because 
French society underwent radical changes and the role of the 
state increased in society. This necessitated some decentrali­
zation reforms to make changes easily and to modernize the 
country. But local administrators, elected officials and pre­
fects resisted decentralization as it was against their 
interests. Elected officials did not support decentralization 
because they enjoyed informal power and authority. Decentrali­
zation meant loss of this authority for the prefects and an 
uncertain future. Also in the parliament, the Jacobins and some 
minor groups opposed decentralization because they did not 
accept it as a way to solve problems.
The communists were behind the decentralization efforts 
and were radically opposed to centralization. For communists 
the prefect must be abolished because it was the exploitative 
agent of the state which was in turn an instrument of the 
capitalist class. The Radicals who opposed the communists in 
the parliament were supporters of centralization because they 
were concerned with the maintenance of the public order. The 
right proposed the structure of local government which was 
established before the Vichy Regime. The right and the Radicals 
saw the elimination of the prefects as a dangerous enterprise 
because it could lead to anarchy, even federalism which meant 
disintegration of national unity, briefly as a threat to "unity
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and indivisibility of the French Republic". At the end of the 
debates in the Parliament in 1946, the Constituent Assembly 
abolished Vichy Regime's left overs and turned to Third Repub- 
lie's local government tradition. The executive head of the 
department became the president of the council but the tutelage 
of the prefect was substituted with administrative control 
which meant that there was not a significant reduction in
central control. 25
III. De Gaullist Technocracy
The political and social conjuncture that made De 
Gaulle a charismatic leader was characterized by the successive 
crisis which had led France to chaos. It was vital for France 
to implement radical policies to modernize the country by 
state-led strategies. But due to a lack of consensus among 
French political elites it was not possible to implement 
radical policies. Within this context Algeria emerged as an 
urgent problem.
Historically speaking the primary problem of the French 
state was that there was nothing like consensus on the nature 
of the regime that had characterized the British or American 
polities. One more problem was related to the structure of 
political parties in regards to polarization. Before De 
Gaulle there existed many antagonist parties and they were so 
divided that the Third and the Fourth Republics never had any 
approximation to a firm majority. The cabinets were made up of 
more parties than one. It was a great possibility that even on
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a simple issue the cabinet could be split and could have a 
26crisis.
Divergent views on basic social and economic policies 
contributed to this polarization. There were different views on 
the issue of what kind of economic and social policies should 
be adopted. Although all fronts saw this issue as significant 
they disagreed on their evaluations. For example, the dominant 
centrist politicians based their policies on the most tradi­
tional elements such as the peasantry and the petty burceoisie 
of the small towns'. But France was undergoing radical changes, 
even transformations which changed the class structures and 
brought new classes into the scene which also meant that old 
classes lost their importance. The centrist politicians reject­
ed to use the government to foster modernization but in fact 
France fell farther behind its main European competitors. 
Therefore, the state-led strategies were necessary to acceler­
ate social and political modernization. Despite this need, the 
attitude of centrist politicians demonstrated a kind of irre­
sponsibility in the sense that they were dealing wich old 
issues related to the peasantry, colonial rule and military 
policy, but not with modernization.
Since there was not an effective parliament, all po'-er was 
concentrated in the hands of a highly centralized bureaucracy. 
The bureaucratic elites were recruited from the upper class of 
Paris. They resisted this change because it would have threat­
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ened their power and that of their friends and relatives who 
owned the country's firms. According to Charles Hauss, the 
bureaucracy posed three problems. First, it blocked innovation 
in both policy making and implementation. Second, because of 
its rigidity and size, people saw it as a potential obstacle 
for their jobs and finally, it lead to a cyclical kind of 
irresponsibility among civil servants (bureaucratic elites) and 
people often found illegal and/or immoral ways of avoiding the
bureaucracy and its rules. 27
The belief that emerged within this social and political 
context was important in terms of the political culture, be­
cause loss of belief in political leaders has led to the loss 
of faith in the parliamentary system. There was a kind of 
alienation of the people in the sense that'they became "defen­
sive" individuals and were convinced that they had to protect 
themselves from the bureaucracy and government.
De Gaulle came out as a strong leader with extraordinary 
rights, strengthened executive over the parliament, made admin­
istration more influential than the parliament, and made some 
administrative reforms to change the bureaucracy, especially to 
increase centralization and efficiency. Most of his efforts
were technocratic rather than democratic. 28
The elites who founded the Fifth Republic with De Gaulle 
believed that for a state to be respected and be strong, it was 
necessary to complement the political and constitutional re­
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forms by administrative reforms. The constitutional reform 
and political reinforcement of the executive have led to a 
corresponding i'eduction in the powers of the parliament. In 
addition to the need to increase power, the founders were also 
motivated by other related objectives. They wanted to increase 
the efficiency. Michel Debre declared that underlying reason to 
strengthen the administration was to rationalize decisions in 
order to depoliticize them, and to reject incrementalism under­
lying reason to strengthen the administration was to rational­
ize decisions in order to depoliticize them, and to reject 
incrementalism practiced by the politicians of the previous 
r e g i m e s . I n  fact De Gaulle was a Jacobin as Hauss noted;
"De Gaulle was a confirmed Jacobin who believed a 
strong France was a centralized France in which one 
person or institution personified the national 
interest .Neither he nor his even more Jacobin advi­
sor Michel Debre ever envisaged anything but margin­
al changes in that system...
....  one of his,first acts upon returning to
France was to restore the prefectural system that
left local administration in central hands".
De Gaulle recruited high ruling civil servants who were trained
at ENA (National School of Administration) as cabinet minis­
ters. The aim of the elite civil servants trained at special 
schools was to implement state-led industrial development.
An extremely tight iron triangle was formed among the new 
Gaullist politicians, businessmen coming from the ranks of the
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bureaucracy, and civil servants of the bureaucracy. They domi­
nated policy making on central, domestic and economic issues 
from 1962 o n w a r d . De Gaulle aimed at setting up a direct link 
between the central state and the periphery. He added for this 
purpose a new level of local administration, the region. Com­
munes were too large in number and they could not serve for the 
purpose of De Gaulle. He thought that region would be an in­
strument for economic revival, administrative reform and polit- 
ical rebalancing. For him, the region was an instrument of 
balance between the center and periphery which was in the hands 
of conservative prefects and notables with complicity relation­
ships. The reform was essentially corporatist, aimed at décon­
centration rather than decentralization. He also established a 
consultative assembly, the CODER (Regional Development Assem­
bly) , to produce and implement the co'rporatist polices effi­
ciently.
Another reform of De Gaulle was the establishment of 
districts including the reorganization of Paris. Mayors opposed 
to the establishment of districts because they saw them as 
taking powers away from the communes and because they could be 
established without the full agreement of the communes in­
volved.
All attempts of De Gaulle at reform were met with the 
resistance of different agents. This resistance of local admin­
istrators, local elected officials, and national politicians 
from both fronts made the reforms impossible to be applied.
43
civil servants as the administrators in the periphery opposed 
them because they represent the old system and transformation 
meant loss of this status. Prefects also opposr.d the reforms 
because they saw them as a threat to their old traditional 
career and their traditional relationship with local notables. 
Local notables opposed because they were from the opposition 
parties. In fact, until 1967 opposition was dominant in the 
periphery.Regionalization meant loss of power for the oppo­
sition. Therefore, these notables resisted the reforms. Decen­
tralization was again considered as a threat to the unity of 
the nation at this time too. For example even Gaullist Michel 
Debre thought that strong regions would be a danger to the 
unity of the nation state. They favored department regions 
which can avoid the problems of centralization without destroy­
ing the Jacobin principle of "uniformity· which was one of the 
imperatives of the French Revolution. Related to this issue, 
the question was almost the same: "How to decentralize or make 
administrative reform within a given structure without destroy­
ing its essential structure?"
There were some groups who wanted changes in the nation­
state because of different reasons. One group were the ethnic 
regionalists, those who demanded local autonomy for Corsica, 
Bretagre, and Occitan. They wanted to destroy the unity of 
France and establish a new federative structure. Another group 
were the Europeanists who thought that particular states in 
Europe were artificial things and Europe was a primary unit of
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administration. But these groups were marginal and had no
practical effects in practice. 34
In 1969 there was a failed regional referendum which 
defeated De Gaulle. Although it was related to regional reform, 
population at large saw referendum more as an issue of the 
regime. This is one reason of the defeat of De Gaulle. De 
Gaullist reforms failed but the need for local government 
reform became more urgent as a result of the inefficiencies of 
local government and the migration in 1960's and 1970s which 
destroyed the representative capability of local governments. 
Many people migrated to the cities, and most of the population 
of the communes decreased and went under two thousand. This 
depopulation of the countryside also decreased the role of 
peasantry. But still successor conservative governments contin­
ued to support peasantry with protectionist measures for farm 
produce. But the socialist-communist front called the reform 
because they allied with the new electorate in the periphery, 
middle class including earners, workers, and middle.managers. 
They recommended a program which aimed at self management in 
the periphery. Again this debate did not produce significant 
changes in practice.
After De Gaulle, the most important innovation toward 
decentralization was the region. The primary concern was to 
rationalize local government in order to increase efficiency by 
reducing the number of communes. But as always was the case, 
the debate on decentralization was alive. It must be noticed
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that there emerged a consensus on the need of decentralization, 
particularly on administrative reform even with the radical 
outlooks in 1970s. De Gaullist party was split and some Gaul­
liste saw regionalization as a way of promoting economic mod­
ernization .
As it will be explained in the last chapter, France by the 
end of the 1950s had been going through radical changes and 
transformations. Parallel to such developments, the nature of 
the state, especially the attitude of the state elites toward 
the periphery changed. Clientalistic relationships has become a 
significant phenomenon in French politics. Another phenomenon 
was the development of interest groups which became influential 
political actors in French politics. The local elected offi­
cials found legal and/or illegal ways of by-passing the pre­
fects and they developed an informal network with the center 
which means that a considerable amount of informal decentrali­
zation emerged.
Interestingly, the right, except for a small minority, did 
not consider decentralization as a threat to national unity. 
Some began to think that decentralization would complete 
democracy of the nation as a whole, not contradict it. They 
supported the reform of Paris which made Paris a special case. 
They thought that tutelage was not necessary because the danger
that makes it necessary no longer existed. 35
The Radical Party was also supportive of decentralization
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too. Local democracy as a concept became a major subject of 
concern in all fronts. The left was strong in the periphery and 
they were supportive because in 1977 elections they were in­
creasingly winning in the municipal and departmental elections. 
Socialists became more interested in local democracy and self 
management. Socialists, especially, were responding to the 
demands for decentralization coming from outside of established 
parties. When they came to power in 1891, they put an end to 
a long lived tradition and decentralized "the one and indivisi­
ble republic" by radical reforms.
IV. The Socialist reforms of Decentralization
The Socialist Fifth Republic put an end to the Republic in 
question not only by radically changing central and local 
relations, but also redefining the role of the state in the 
periphery. The socialist -eform which was called la grande 
affair du septenent, the . ost important event of the last 
century or of Mitterrand', seven year presidency also marked 
the end of the various attempts of failed reforms.
As it has already been noted the debate on decentraliza­
tion was a major political and administrative concern of the 
French political and state elites. In fact, there was always 
a desire for decentralization due to different reasons, but the 
response was negative and only under the Third Republic a 
limited reform was successfully made. Although it will be 
elaborated further in the last chapter, as a result of the 
instability of the French society due to lack of consensus
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among the elites and various groups, the French state emerged 
as an autonomous agent that puts parameters without taking 
sec'tional interests of the private groups into consideration. 
Therefore, centralization became an issue directly related to 
the unity of the state and decentralization as a challenge to 
it. The French Revolution determined the fate of the successive 
reforms in such a way that the primary question was how to 
decentralize within the given administrative structure. But the 
French society in which the socialists came to power was dif­
ferent from the previous decades. It has changed throughout the 
centuries, and through the Gaullist modernization period. These 
changes plus the political conjuncture of the Socialist Fifth 
Republic made it easier to decentralize.
Socialist decentralization reforms transferred the execu­
tive powers, administrative functions and financial resources 
from the central government to the various levels of local 
government. In June 1981, Michel Deferre was appointed Minister 
of Interior and Decentralization, He was previously the mayor 
of Marseille and socialist deputy for 45 years. He was a de­
fender of decentralization. Deferre was against the existing
system which gave the unelected officials more rights to decide
3 7and competence on the local issues than elected mayors. In 
fact, most radical part of the reform was the abolishment of 
the prefects. The name of the law that presented to The Nation­
al Assembly at the opening session of the new parliament in 
July 1981 was the Law on the Rights and Liberties for Communes,
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Departments and Regions. The debate on the law took an eight 
month period.^® The decentralization law makes virtually no 
changes in the structure of local government in France, the 
only change in local government structure was the creation of 
decentralized district councils to take over some functions of 
the city councils to deal with housing, local amenities and 
welfare in three big cities (Paris, Marseille, and Lyons).
The most crucial change was concerned with the role of the 
prefect and the tutelage. With the weeks of the initial legis­
lation period, the executive power at the departmental and 
regional levels was transferred from the prefects to the elect­
ed presidents. The prefects were abolished and were replaced by 
commissaires de la republigue They are official representative 
of the Prime Minister and have no executive power. In addition 
to this, all priori tutelage over local authorities disap­
peared.'^*^ The abolishment of prefects and disappearance of 
prioricontrol signaled an end to the state's penetration of 
periphery. The regions and departments became genuine local 
governments with their executive p o w e r s . T h e y  gained more 
flexibility in their decision making and rules, they also 
gained further freedom in their internal organization and to 
recruit their own personnel for their jobs.
On the abolishment of the prefects and central control, 
the right made a strong opposition. For them it was a threat 
to the national unity and direct election of regional council 
was an expression of regional "sovereignty" in contradiction to
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the sovereignty of the nation. Bur proposal found major support 
in the parliament and this minor opposition did not create big
problems in legislation 42
In regards to the functions of local government, regions 
gained new roles in the formulation and implementation of 
national economic plan. Each regional council prepared a five 
year regional plan in which the priorities were defined. The 
general principle was formulated in such a way that any trans­
fer of function would be accompanied by a corresponding amount 
of financial transfer from the state. Departments had some 
specific responsibilities such as provision of socio-medical 
care, organization of social security schemes, provision of 
school transport, and maintenance of secondary school build­
ings.^^ The role of communes is defined as town planning and 
urban development.
One more reform was related to the electoral system of the 
local government authorities. Up zo the socialist period, the 
departmental councils were elected with single-member wards 
(cantons) voting in two ballots. If there is no candidate that 
gets the majority in the first ballot there would be a second 
ballot in which the candidate who gets more than the others is 
declared the winner (i.e; plurality) Due to this electoral 
system there had been some coalitions among right and left 
fronts. The changes concern the areas with more than 35000 
inhabitants. The members in councils will vary according to 
their inhabitants. In reforms, majority system was preserved.
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In the first ballot if a list received absolute majority it 
automatically gets half of the seats in the council. The rest 
is distributed to each list which includes the winner list 
according to the proportion of their votes. Lists which get 
under 5 percent of the votes get no seats. There is a second 
ballot if none of the lists can get majority in the first 
ballot. The competitors in the second ballot are the lists 
which received at least 10 percent of the votes in the first 
ballot.Paris, Marseille, and Lyons have a different system.
All of these reforms have changed the French local govern­
ment structure. The commentators have different views on the 
reform. Some claim that the socialist decentralization program 
depends on its previous reforms in which many of its elements 
were proposed. This is not a wrong idea. In fact the decentral­
ization v/as not an event that suddenly came out, rather it was 
a result of the long process that started earlier. Although 
comments are different, there is a certain point that Michael 
Keating noted;
"What is certain is that the varied patterns of 
relationships emerging in the cities, small towns 
and the countryside, and in different parts of the 
country, represent a further breakdown of the jaco­
bin principle of uniformity.
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CHAPTER III
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TRADITION 
AND
DECENTRALIZATION IN TURKEY
I. The Historical Development of Local Government in Turkey
The principle cleavage in the Ottoman polity was between 
the center and periphery. There were no countervailing powers 
that check the power of the center as in feudalism, thus pe­
riphery was totally dominated by the center which was made up 
of the military- bureaucratic elites. Within such state of 
affairs there was neither a local government institution having 
a distinct status nor a local government tradition.
In Turkey, unlike in Western Europe, local government does 
not have a long tradition. It started with the Tanzimat Refor­
mation which aimed at top down modernization of society and the 
reinforcement of the central power. Before the Tanzimat Refor­
mation , the functions which now belong to local government were 
done by kadi who had also judicial and administrative func­
tions. The Kadi was not an elected member, but he was a cen­
trally appointed member.^ His municipal functions were the 
supervision of local markets and the organization of local
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affairs.^ In fact, before the Tanzimat Reformation, the Otto­
man statesmen did not have a conceptual distinction between 
central administration and local administration and all func­
tions were carried out by the civil servants of the sultan
. 3acting on behalf of him.
The establishment of local government institutions had 
begun as part of the modernization efforts. Since the moderni­
zation was a project that was implemented officially from top 
to down, local government reforms could not be separated from 
the same approach. Like all other policies aimed at moderniza­
tion, local governmant reforms were implemented from top to 
down. These reforms began to take place along with moderniza­
tion .
November 3, 1839 marked the beginning of a new period in 
the Ottoman political and social life. Gulhane-i Hatt-i Humavu- 
nu (Imperial Rescript of Gulhane) was declared in front of the 
people, state elites, religious leaders from different reli­
gions and the diplomats of the foreign states. Primary motive 
behind this decleration was to reinforce the central power by 
making unfunctioned institutions work through various reforms, 
and to respond positively to the pressures of the Great Powers. 
in particular, France, England and Russia. The political con­
ception underlying the Tanzimat was a direct relationship 
between the state and its subjects. It was also a practical 
solution to mobilize masses behind the state against the local 
notables who previously gained some power.
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As a part of the implementation of the Tanzimat policy 
after 1840 the Muhasillik cc-ancils were created and they gained 
legal status. Although the electoral system to select some of 
the council members had significant restrictions, some elected 
members existed as the representatives of the people. According 
to liber Ortayli the existence of elected members was an 
important step for further developments because 1871 General 
Provincial Law ndare-i Umumivvevi Vilayet) presumed that half 
of the representatives should be from Muslim groups and half of 
the representatives should be from non-Muslim groups. This has 
lead to the beginning of a secular tradition.^ Since the Otto­
man state was a religiously oriented one, the establishment of 
the representative institutions including the representatives 
coming from different ethnic and religious groups constituted a 
base for subsequent secular and constitutionalist movements.
Another step towards a local government tradition during 
this period was the creation of the Şehremaneti in 1854. It was 
run by a centrally appointed member called the Şehremini and 
had a council made up of 12 appointed persons. To be appointed 
as a member of the council someone should be a well known and 
respected person which reflects the elitist understanding of 
the center.^ The Şehremaneti was responsible to provide basic 
goods and services, to oversee markets, to make roads and 
building sidewalks. Still, the authority did not have its own 
financial resources and was totally dependent upon the center.
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Not surprisingly these councils were under the strict control 
of the center and were far from being autonomous and civil 
societal elements. Although the provincial local councils were 
established as a part of the decentralization policy of the 
Tanzimat. the primary motive was to improve the tax collection. 
The administrative councils had only advisory powers and they 
did not know clearly the weight of their recommendations. 
During this period what center understood from local government 
was a new administrative unit of the central government to
function in urban centers. 8
The fact that the state elites were against the devolution 
of power in the true sense of the word did not mean that they 
were not interested in better organization of the public serv­
ices and conducting urban affairs. In the nineteenth century, 
insufficient infrastructure of the cities was a barrier to the 
economic and social developments. Public services were unorgan­
ized and contributed to this phenomenon. In addition to the 
desire of the state elites to have a good infrastructure, Great 
Powers also forced the Ottoman State to have better port cities 
as center of economic activities which in turn necessitated 
better infrastructure. Because of these reasons the first 
municipal administration was established in Pera (Beyoğlu) 
which was also a port center and a center of foreign embassy 
and business.^ The official language was French and it was 
run according to the recommendations of an appointed committee 
of seven called the Committee of Order (intizam Komisyonu) . The 
fact that this committee comprised six foreigners and only one
Turk is a significant illustration of the lack of interest on
the part of the local population. 10
During the Tanzimat period municipality could be developed 
as a powerful civil societal institution, but the emerging non- 
muslim merchant bourgeoisie of the Ottoman Empire supported 
separatist nationalistic movements and this reinforced the 
prejudices of the center against the municipality,^^ National­
ist movements had become a worldwide phenomenon during the 
second half of the nineteenth century. The Ottoman state was 
sensitive to the nationalist movements because it could dis­
solve the Ottoman mosaic made up of different ethnic and reli­
gious groups. Since the first municipality was established by 
non-Muslims, it represented a challenge to the central control. 
Therefore, the attitude of the center towards municipality 
remained critical. Under these conditions, the municipal insti­
tutions during this time could not go beyond being an agent of 
the central government. In this century it was not possible to 
separate municipal bodies and provincial administration in the 
Ottoman periphery. Despite the rules that gave the municipali­
ties their legal status most of the Ottoman cities did not have 
municipal organizations. In fact, during this period the 
creation of municipal administration did not become a trend 
throughout the country. The masses kept themselves attached to 
the traditional institutions. These groups actively resisted 
the reforms imposed from above in the period between 1800 and 
1850.
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The tradition of local government in its rudimentary 
sense was only in the villages of the Ottoman society. It was 
not a result of the development of the civic culture or the 
existence of civil societal elements in the village but was due 
to the fact that for centuries the central government was not 
in a position to intervene effectively to the village life and 
fulfill the necessary social functions. Their organization 
was similar to the administrative organization of small commu­
nities. Persons who were effective and known met in some common 
places such as a mosque and tried to find solutions to their 
problems. They also had some common properties such as pastures 
and woods which were financial resources for necessary expendi­
tures. But they were not corporate entities.
Although the village had such a long history, as a socio­
logical unit in the Ottoman context, the creation of the vil­
lage as a local government unit had begun after the Tanzimat.
A decree proclaimed in 1864 which was about the administration 
of the provinces assigned for the villages a popularly elected 
village headman (Muhtar), and the councils of elders. Muhtar 
was the chief administrator of the village affairs and the 
local agent of the central government. Although there are some 
substantial differences, many provisions of this decree de­
scribe a traditional situation that has been perpetuated until 
today.Speaking in a broad sense it can be said that the 
Tanzimat reforms -aiming at modernization impos.2d from above 
to make the necessary changes to restore and reinforce the
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central power- could not create a strong local government 
tradition in the true sense of the word. The councils estab­
lished as part of the reforms were far from being local gov­
ernment bodies and civil societal institutions limiting the 
power of the state vis-a- vis the social groups. They were 
considered as the arms of the central government in the locali­
ties and the primary concern was to increase centralization and 
to collect taxes more efficiently.
All in all, the last decades of the nineteenth century was 
important in Ottoman history. In regards to the local govern­
ment tradition of the Ottoman society, its importance comes 
from the fact that these councils constituted the rudiments of 
the local government system.·^ In fact, by the end of the 
nineteenth century, the Turkish local government system at the 
village, municipal and provincial level had reached a pattern 
which remained as such for decades. This pattern began taking 
place in the nineteenth century, and continued with the reforms 
of the Second Constitutional period at the beginning of this 
century. The Ordinance of 1913 explicitly mentioned the provin­
cial local administration with a corporate status, a locally 
elected council which chooses an executive committee and cen­
trally appointed members 18
Within these reforms and especially with the onset of the 
Tanzimat period, there emerged an important phenomenon re­
garding the state that is crucial to understand the Ottoman
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legacy of the Turkish Republic. The relationship between the 
civil bureaucrats and the Sultan changed in such a way that the 
bureaucrats gained the status of state elites. In the classical 
sense bureaucrats belonged to the sultan but when they acguired 
political influence they adopted the secularizing orientation 
started by Mahmut II. The state and the sultan were differenti­
ated and the bureaucratic elite of this period viewed them­
selves as the servants of the state and not of the sultan. They 
freed themselves from the Islamic tradition, and claimed that 
it was best to leave this tradition. They became the faithful 
instruments of radical administrative reforms, and did not 
represent group or class interests and not even their own.^^ 
The new state was structured within the civil bureaucracy and 
in the Young Turks era within the military. Gradually, within
this state of affairs, a strong state emerged. 20
The Turkish Republic was established on this heritage and 
centralization was one of the defining characteristics of the 
new era. Again the same elites were in power and operated with 
the same rationality similar to their Ottoman version. Despite 
the various reforms aiming at democratization and modernization 
of the country, center remained sensitive to any kind of chal­
lenge to its power. Within this state of affairs the local 
government bodies could not go beyond being the agents of the 
central government in localities, highly dependent upon the 
central government financially, politically, and administra­
tively through various kinds of tutelage.
62
Before going into the Republican period, it must be noted 
that in the last period of the Ottoman Empire there were ideas 
favoring Доге decentralization policies. A pro-liberal Prens 
Sabahattin maintained that it was best to have a decentralized 
administration. He was more liberal in his attitude towards the 
periphery. According to Sabahattin in order to have a decen­
tralized model the vali, a centrally appointed member, should 
have more competence, and there should be a provincial board 
elected by the people. Financial and administrative control? 
should be left to the people. Tanzimat reforms, for him, were 
far from this aim.^^ Needless to say, despite the fact' that 
Sabahattin aimed to maintain a better decentralized model, his 
model was highly centralized too. Yet, it still seemed ahead of 
its time.
II. The Local Government in the Republican Period
The Republican state was established in a critical period 
during which the state had to fight against internal and exter­
nal enemies. There was the war of independence (1919-1922), and 
the problem of Kurdish nationalism. Under these state of af­
fairs it was the fear of the founders of the new Republic 
(Mustafa Kemal and his friends) that Anatolia could be 
split.Therefore the stress on centralization and general 
will became the characteristic feature of the new state in 
question. In fact, the Republic did not inherit a strong local 
government tradition. The Republic itself had its own rationale 
that stressed the reinforcement of the powers of central
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government. 23
The municipal law proclaimed in 1930 was designed to make 
local government bodies the agents of central government in the 
periphery. Although some changes were made related to local 
government, basic rationale remained the same. The law takes 
the local government bodies as corporate entities, and gives 
legal status to the local government in Turkey. It has been at 
work until 1980s except for some minor changes. Designed by the 
central elite or by their agents this law aimed not to create a 
kind of local government based on the principle of local 
democracy, but a kind of local government which functions as 
the irms of a central government in the periphery under strict 
administrative, financial and political control.
Similar to France, decentralization of local government 
was an issue related to the fear of the national unity in the 
minds of the central bureaucratic or administrative elite. As 
it was noted:
"The new Turkish Republic established in 
1923 did not really attempt to change this (Ottoman. 
M.Y.) centralized system, although it passed legis­
lation in 1930 to enable local communities to 
create semiautonomous local authorities in the 
Western pattern. Despite the establishment of 
modern municipal institutions in major cities, the 
nature of administration remained highly central­
ized mainly because of the domestic and external
64
security needs of a newly established state. In 
other words, efforts to integrate the nation both 
geographically and ethnically did not allow the- 
central government to delegate much of its
powers to local authorities".^'^
The law proclaimed that;
"(1) The acquisition by local government units of legal 
status as corporate persons and their main taining 
such a status are subject to legal super vision;
(2) The duties of the local governmental 
units are delineated in detail by laws enacted by 
the Parliament; and
(3) The central administration has close 
control on financial resources of the local govern­
mental units".
Although the Republican elite made a conceptual distinc­
tion between the local government and local administration this 
kind of tutelage have not allowed the local government to 
develop as an autonomous entity which would be more than local 
administration.
After the Second World War, urbanization emerged as a 
structural factor which strongly effected the local government 
in Turkey. It must be noted that this high level of urbaniza­
tion was not accompanied by the same level of industrialization 
as it was the case in the developed European countries. This 
brought new problems to the local governments in general and
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municipalities in particular, lhan Tekeli mentions three kinds 
of important changes and/or effects on the local government, 
especially the municipalities. The first important change led 
by rapid urbanization was related to the contradiction between 
great municipalities and small ones. The law allows the estab­
lishment of a municipality in residence with a population of 
two thousand and above. This led to the creation of weak munic­
ipalities in large numbers. Their abilities and financial 
resources were radically different from the great municipali­
ties. Great municipalities had their resources but small munic­
ipalities were totally dependent upon central government.
The second change caused by rapid urbanization was the 
accelerated establishment of the peripheral local governments 
around the metropolitan ones. For example, attached to Istanbul 
municipality there were 34 municipalities in 1976. Metropolitan 
municipalities had greater per capita income than district 
municipalities, and district municipalities were the areas in 
which gecekondu housing was a wider problem. This means that 
they did not have sufficient infrastructure and were dependent 
upon the infrastructural capacity of the metropolitan munici­
palities. Today the situation does not seem much different. 
This contradiction has also been a legitimate reason used by 
the central government to maintain a highly centralized local
government system 27
The third and most important change was associated with 
the investments for necessary urban services as well as an
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increase in urban population. Necessary investments for urban 
services had increased more rapidly than the urban 
population.In fact, with the effects of the mass media, the 
expectations of the urban population increased. So did the 
demands of the private sector for better infrastructure and 
the demands of the people for education. But local governments 
could not keep pace with these developments because they were 
not designed as entities that could easily cope with these
demands.29
There existed no harmonious balance between the functions ‘ 
divided between central government and local government. In 
Turkey division of functions between central and local govern­
ment was not done by rational criteria, and the balance had 
changed in favor of central government.^® In the distribution 
of resources, one could see that there was great inequality 
between central government and local government. Productive 
resources were left to the central government and less produc­
tive resources to the local government.®^ The resources that 
were left to the local government were sensitive to inflation 
and inflation swept out their resources.
In addition to the unequal division of responsibility, 
central government could easily influence the resources of 
local governments. In fact, under a highly centralized system 
less than ten percent of all revenues were allocated by the 
local governments. The main revenue source of municipalities
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were direct municipal taxes and local shares of certain nation­
al taxes. But central government could easily increase the 
burden of local governments. For instance, the central govern­
ment by passing a personnel law in the 1960s increased the 
salaries of the public personnel and it became impossible to
balance the budgets of the local governments. 32
The local financial problems were also intensified by the 
central government because it failed to meet its legal obliga­
tions to the cities. This means that they received less than 
what was allowed by the law. And the strong centralization 
denied the cities the necessary means to deal adequately wirh 
the urban problems. They had no flexibility in determining the
local taxes and expenditures 33
Although the law assumed that local authorities were 
provided with the sources of revenue in proportion to their 
functions, this did not work due to the attitude of the central 
government toward local governments. Bank of Provinces (Iller 
Bankasi), the only source which provides credits to local 
government, particularly to the municipalities could no longer 
meet the needs of the municipalities. Moreover in the distribu­
tion of the resources partisan considerations wer« e^ry common. 
Within this state of affairs the provincial loca administra­
tion as a level of the local administration lost its power. 
Most of the functions done previously by provincial local 
administration were taken by other institutions of central 
government which resulted in a loss of power. Municipalities
6 8
witnessed serious fiscal crisis.
During the 1960s the local government began to become a 
new concern of the central government for the aim was not to 
increase their autonomy but to direct their potentials to the 
national development. The new pace started with the First Five- 
Year Development Plan(1963). In this plan priority was given to 
the underdeveloped regions in regards with the distribution of 
the public investments. It was spelled out that further growth 
of the big cities in the country should be allowed if employ- 
ment opportunities were made available.
In the Second-Five Year Development Plan (1968-1972) 
emphasis was laid on regional development and urbanization. It 
was declared that growing centers in Anatolia should be sup­
ported to save the metropolis of the Western Turkey, and large 
urban centers should contribute to the process of economic and 
social development in proportion with their size.^^
In the planned period, the most important project was 
MEHTAP (Central Government Organization Research Project) which 
aimed to create a necessary change in administration in order 
to accelerate economic growth. It was declared that the divi­
sion of responsibility and functions between the central gov­
ernment, its organs in localities and the local government was 
subject to further investigation.^^ The central and local 
government relations were also an issue of investigation.
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Although some investigations were made under this approach 
clear cut policies for the regional development and urban 
growth were not adopted and maintained over time. Objectives 
and priorities shifted from plan to plan which made it diffi­
cult for central government to direct resources effectively. 
Additional reasons such as inadequate resources in financing 
projects contributed negatively to the realization of
projects.38
It can be concluded that during the 1960s the central 
government did not make any serious effort in solving the 
problems of the local governments with the exceptions that have 
already been explained. The problems were accumulated for 
decades and reached to the crisis in 1973 when municipal elec­
tions in major urban centers like Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir
were won by the center-left members when a center right coali-
. . 39tion was in power.
In the 1973 election, there was a change in the general 
pattern of the local government elections. Until 1950, RPP 
(Republican People's Party) as one party in the Turkish poli­
tics was in power. Beginning from 1950 onwards, governments and 
mayors were generally the members of the same party. This 
continued until 1970 as a general pattern. This made it easy 
to establish a harmonious relationship between the central and 
local governments.^*^ But after the 1973 elections, as has 
already been noted, this pattern has changed, and there emerged 
a serious crisis when the central government took partisan
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considerations, and began to exercise strict tutelage over the 
center-left mayors. This crisis had reached its peak when the 
Ministry of Interior attempted to fire the Mayor of Ankara 
without basing his action on legally tenable grounds.
At the beginning, these center-left mayors did not have 
definite programs to implement. But later with the contribution 
of some left-wing intellectuals they developed a program called 
"democratic or participatory municipality". In general they 
were behind local autonomy and even devolution rather than 
delegation.
When RPP came to power in 1978, this project found a 
chance to be implemented. Democratic municipality model was 
based, first of all, on local autonomy. In addition to this 
autonomy there were other principles that guided this movement. 
Democratic municipality, according to these principles, should 
be; (1) democratic participatory; (2)productive; (3) rfesource 
creator; (4 )director; (5) coordinator; (6) unitist. The whole 
project had mainly two dimensions. The first one was related to 
the function of local government in the urban life, and the 
second one was related to the interaction between people and 
the members of local government. The second principle was 
based on the belief that the interaction could increase the 
local democracy. As part of this movement an attempt was made 
in the economic sphere (known by the acronym TANSA) to provide 
commodities from producers to consumers without any intermadi-
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ary agent. But this project turned out to be unsuccessful. Due 
to financial and provisional problems, and problems of organi­
zation, it could not realize its goals.
Another attempt was the creation of the Ministry of Local 
Government based on the following principles;
"(1) Municipalities should be instrumental 
in promoting local democracy and in integrating 
people around the idea of city.
(2) The fiscal confusion at the center 
should be eliminated.
(3) The municipalities should play a major 
role against unhealthy urbanization and unearned 
rent income thereof.
(4) The municipalities should join 
forces through municipal unions.
(5) Municipalities should engage in eco­
nomic activities.
(6) The municipalities should develop 
their own technical know-how and should no longer
be dependent on the Bank of Provinces". 4 4
But the Municipality was stopped before the realization 
of its projects, thus it is hard to evaluate the attempts. It 
is evident that this attempt had aimed to find a solution for 
oe problems of the periphery coming from the center. Although 
aimed at more decentralization and democratization, it could 
.,ot go beyond the attempt already explained. In short, the
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status of local government did not change drastically until 
1980. It was the military intervention that marked a new begin­
ning in the history of local government in Turkey.
III. The Local Government Decentralization 
in Post-1980 Turkey
It has already been noted that the problems of local gov­
ernment in general, and municipalities in particular, increased 
and reached to the level of a crisis in the 1970s and a trend 
has begun from the center towards dealing with the problems of 
municipalities with a more democratic perspective.
With the establishment of the military government after the 
military intervention in 1980, a new period has started in the 
municipal life or in general in the local government tradition 
in Turkey. The military authorities, as a source for their own 
legitimacy, claimed that the regime was in danger and interven­
tion was inevitable to stop the anarchy since political parties 
were, not in a position to overcome the troubles. By using this 
rhetoric they intervened almost to every institution. Local 
governments were not saved from this overhaul.
The government formed by the military in 1980 aimed at 
having a strong state, namely a central government, therefore 
they increased the central control due to their philosophy to 
reinforce the concept of the state. According to the military 
authorities, the municipalities were involved in the pre-1980
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proposition about the local government in Turkey in the party 
program. Act of 34 in the party program declared that in public 
administration it was necessary to reduce centrgilization and to 
increase efficiency in public services. In the program, the 
rationale behind the decentralization reform is explained as 
efficiency, and it is not stressed that their goal was to 
increase local autonomy and democracy.
In fact, MP established a two-tier metropolitan municipal­
ity system which was a product of short-term electoral strategy 
at least to the extent that they aimed at long-term need for 
reform in local government. In the first local election, MP 
government was optimistic about the winning of mayorality in 
some large urban centers. Thus they created a two-tier metro­
politan system which is made up of metropolitan municipality 
and district municipalities. The results of the election was a
surprise for the MP because they won at both levels. 50
In the 1984 local election, a law was proclaimed to insti­
tute the reforms in question, which made it mandatory to elect 
both a metropolitan council and a municipal council in the 
metropolitan areas where there were more than one administra­
tive districts. The law also claimed the election of separate 
mayors for both metropolitan city and for the district munici­
palities .51
At the metropolitan level there are three different au­
75
thorities that run it, a metropolitan municipality mayor, a 
metropolitan municipal council and a metropolitan municipal 
executive board. The district mayors and one fifth of the 
members of the district municipal councils constitute the 
metropolitan municipal council. The mayor of the metropolitan 
municipality is the head of the council. In order to have a 
strong executive control at the metropolitan level the assist­
ant mayoralty was abolished and a new agency, an appointed 
secretary general and an executive board made up of appointed 
and non-elected members was c r e a t e d . T h e  second tier is 
responsible for the activities such as programming of detailed 
activities and actual day to day operation of the services.
In addition to the institutional arrangements, these 
reforms include also a financial aspect. The new municipal law, 
although decreased the local revenue sources, transferred more 
productive taxes from central government to local governments. 
The interesting and, to the same extent, important feature was 
that for the first time in Turkey it was proclaimed that those 
inhabitants who live in surrounding areas using municipal 
services were required to pay municipal taxes. The share of 
municipalities increased from 5 percent to 10.3 percent. This 
is a significant increase in comparison to the past.^^
Despite the fact that municipalities have more resources 
at their disposal their resources are still inadequate and can 
not solve the problems of municipalities. This becomes more 
problematic at the district level because metropolitan munici­
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pality has the right to exercise tutelage power over district 
municipalities. Under such a condition they face a critical
. . . . R Rimbalance between their resources and their aspirations. They- 
have less productive resources than the metropolitan municipal­
ities. Within this aspect another development was the estab­
lishment of some authorities such as ISKI (Istanbul Water and 
Sewerage Authority) which is becoming gradually more independ­
ent and works financially with the rationality of modern munic­
ipal finance. 56
From the functional point of view metropolitan municipali­
ties gained some new functions. Some of them are related to 
strategic investment plannings, dealing with large infrastruc­
tures. Others are making Master plans for the metropolitan 
areas, transportation, sewerage, water supply, establishment of 
parks, green areas, gardens, and disposal of solid waste.
Most significant development was the transferring of the 
tutelage power from central government to the metropolitan 
municipality, in particular metropolitan mayor. Heper indicates 
that:
"The tutelage powers that had previously 
been exercised by central government were 
transferred to the metropolitan munici­
pality, more specifically to the metropolitan 
mayor. In the last analysis the tutelage of the 
Ministry of Interior over the metropolitan
77
municipality now amounted to the approval of 
the appointment of the secretary general of 
the metropolitan municipality as well as the 
creation of the new posts in the municipality. 
The ministry of Public Work and Resettle­
ment, too, no longer exercised any hierarchical 
supervision over the metropolitan municipality; 
the Ministry only provided "information" and extend­
ed some funds on a project basis".
Local government bodies historically were under strict 
tutelage control of central agencies. It must be noted that in 
Turkey political control has been more important than adminis­
trative control. This can clearly be seen, for example, during 
the interregnum 1980-83 in such a way that local governments 
became very close to local administration as executive agents 
of central government. With the new regulation, metropolitan 
municipalities gained new tutelage powers which put them in a 
strong position not only vis-a-vis district municipalities but 
in regards to the relevant ministries in A n k a r a . O v e r  the 
district municipalities both the metropolitan municipality 
council and mayor had extensive powers that they could modify 
the budgets of district municipalities before the final approv­
al and could settle disputes among the district municipalities,
or between the district municipalities and metropolitan munici­
pality.^® This relationship is based on the assumption that 
metropolitan and district municipalities are 'unified entities'
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but in reality it is a potential for conflicts. In fact there 
are some conflicts due to the relationship in question.
Concerning the relationship between the metropolitan 
municipality and district municipalities, it is clear that it 
is not compatible with local democracy and local autonomy. For 
example, in Istanbul some of the district mayors argued that 
metropolitan municipality took upon itself the responsibility 
of carrying out what can be considered as vote-cathing func­
tions and left to the district municipalities other insignifi­
cant functions. They are acting more arbitrarily and in a 
discriminatory manner when they use the tutelage control over 
district m a y o r s . I n  situations when a mayor of a district is 
from different parties the problems can become more urgent.
The division of responsibility is another source of 
problem in both theory and practice because it is not clearly 
defined. Ersin Kalaycioglu gives examples pertaining to dis­
trict municipalities' control over the market places when it is 
assumed that this task is to be coordinated by the office of 
the metropolitan mayor. There can be some situations when the 
metropolitan municipality may take some functions previously 
performed by the district municipality but financed by the
metropolitan municipality 62
Bureaucracy also poses some problems. The bureaucracy and 
the bureaucrats are still in a critical position in the new
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system.Most of the mayors think that bureaucracy is a barri­
er to function effectively and the relationship between munici­
pality and people should be direct and mayorality should 
belong to the people.
Although there are crucial developments toward decentrali­
zation and local autonomy, it is the fact that neither metro­
politan governments nor other units of government in Turkey can 
be considered as autonomous in the real sense of the word. They 
are still administratively, financially, and politically de­
pendent upon the central government. The new system transferred 
the tutelage power to the metropolitan municipality but decen­
tralization stopped at the metropolitan level and did not 
extend to the district level. In this case the role of the 
state was taken by the metropolitan municipalities, and their 
approach to the district municipalities is similar to the
earlier attitude of the central government. 64
The reasons of the success (maybe not failure) of a limit­
ed degree of decentralization reforms lies at the crux of the 
political culture and political development in Turkey. Although 
it will be further elaborated in the concluding chapter it must 
be noted that since 1950 Turkey has been making progress toward 
a more democratic way of life. After 1980 this process reached 
to the level that the central elite, i.e. military bureaucratic 
elite have begun to interpret Ataturkism, the official ideolo­
gy of these elites, in more flexible way. They do not take the 
principles of Ataturkism as totally guiding norms such as
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etatism, to a certain extent secularism, and they welcomed 
economic liberalism despite the fact that etatism was one of 
the main principles of A t a t u r k i s m . O n  the one hand, it 
became clear that the problems of the local government in 
Turkey could not be resolved by the policies that are imposed 
from the center. On the other hand, in the course of time the 
bureaucracy and the military has lost its power vis-a-vis the 
political elites. This process started during the 1950s with 
the multi-party politics by which political elites as the 
representatives of the people gained increasing importance in 
society. After the 1980 military intervention a consensus 
emerged among the different sections of society which meant 
that military intervention was not a solution to the problems 
of Turkey. In contrast to this period, at the background of the 
1960 military intervention one can see that the bureaucracy, 
military, university and intelligensia made a coalition against 
the civil government which made the intervention possible. In 
this social and political conjuncture, the Motherland Party 
found a good chance to implement the decentralization policies.
On the other side of the coin, the approach to local 
government in Turkey was lopsided, and the problems were re­
duced to the fiscal gap. Even the reduction in function was not 
taken as an effective way to solve the problems of the local 
governments.^^ The approach which ignored the development of 
local autonomy was reinforced by the fact that in the Ottoman- 
Turkish context there existed no local government tradition
81
which limits the power of the center. Even in the new reforms
the initiative comes from the center and not from a "civic
f i  7community".
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CHAPTER IV
IV. THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TRADITION AND DECENTRALIZATION 
IN FRANCE AND TURKEY: A COMPARISON
I. The Local Government in France and Turkey
Local government in Turkey, like in France, is organized 
at three levels: The provincial, municipality, and the village. 
The local governmental structure in Turkey resembles the system 
in France. Like France, Turkey is divided into provinces, and 
each province is run by a centrally appointed member, governor 
ivali).  ^A province is an administrative unit of the central 
government and territorial unit of the local government. In 
every province there is a "provincial local administration" 
which is made up of a general assembly, a permanent board and a 
governor. The general assembly is a collection of members who 
are elected according to a system of proportional representa­
tion. The general assembly and the permanent board are consul­
tative bodies and the governor is the executive.
Provincial local administration has traditionally been 
responsible for many functions (such as the construction of 
city and village roads, village water system, village schools 
etc.) but in the course of time they have lost their functions
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and these functions have been taken by other agencies of cen­
tral government.
The smallest unit of local government is the village. It 
was established by the Village Law of 1924. At the top level of 
village administration is the headman (muhtax). There is also a 
council of elders which is made up of eight to twelve members. 
Most of the jobs are done by joint efforts of villagers 
(imece). Village administration organizes the business and has 
a revenue called salma which is a locally collected tax.^
In Turkey, the most important unit of local government is 
the municipality. Although municipal government dates back to 
the 1850s, it took its recent form by the Law numbered 1580 
proclaimed in 1930 and with the exception of new metropolitan 
municipalities it is still at work. Municipality is made up of 
an elected mayor who is the chief executive of municipal gov­
ernment, a municipal council, and a municipal executive 
board. Mayor oversees municipal budgets and authorizes expendi­
tures.^ Until 1963, mayors were elected by the municipal coun­
cils from amongst the council members. Since 1963 mayors have 
been elected by popular vote.
The local government in France is organized , like in 
Turkey, at three levels: regional, departmental and communal. 
Most important similarity between France and Turkey on this 
matter is related to the central-local government relations.
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Like Turkey, until recent reforms, French local government 
authorities were under the tutelage of central government.'^ The 
prefect who corresponds to the vali in Turkey exercises tute­
lage power on behalf of the central government. All actions 
and decisions, until the 1982 decentralization program, were 
subjected to the a priori tutelage control of the prefect.
In Turkey, central government exercises various types of 
control over local government authorities. But in comparison to 
France, control over local government bodies has produced a 
more centralized system of local government in Turkey.^ For 
example, the law which regulates the exercise of tutelage gives 
to a centrally appointed authority (vali in provinces and 
kavmakam in districts), under some conditions,, the right to 
fire a mayor. This kind of tutelage which is exercised very 
extensively turns a local government unit to a part of central 
government located in its hierarchical structure.^ In France on 
the other hand, in the course of time, the formal tutelage of 
the prefect has become progressively less important over the 
years and a kind of complicity has developed between mayors and 
the prefects.^ This relationship has strengthened the local 
government and the position of the mayors vis-a-vis the central 
government. Mayors in France enjoyed more freedom in comparison 
to the mayors in Turkey.
From the financial and functional point of view, it has 
previously been noted that, the most critical problem that the 
Turkish municipalities faced was financial. Financially they
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have been strongly dependent upon the central government and 
the distribution of resources have been done by partisan con­
siderations. In fact there was a sharp inequality between the 
functions of the local governments and their resources. The 
different shares from the total public expenditure to local 
government in France and Turkey is enough to indicate the 
differences between the two. In 1979, it was 54.6 in France 
whereas it was 9.8 per cent in Turkey.® Under these conditions, 
the local finances acquires a political character and become a 
tool for political control. In Turkey this control is usually 
exercised by the central government against the mayors espe­
cially if they belong to an opposition party,
II. The Local Government Tradition in France and Turkey
In order to understand the similarities and differences 
between France and Turkey in terms of the local government 
tradition, it is necessary to look at the fundamental differ­
ences between a feudal and a patrimonial society. In contrast 
to France, the Ottoman Turkish society does not have a feudal 
tradition.^ The Ottoman Empire traditionally had neither a 
hereditary aristocracy or independent church hierarchy nor 
self-governing cities. The Ottoman- Turkish society had no 
intermediary institutions between the state and society which 
was a basic characteristics of the feudal societies.
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As Halil Inalcik aptly noted the Ottoman society was made 
up of two main classes: Military which belonged to the sultan 
and reava which was made up of all muslim and non-muslim sub­
jects who had no place in the government. The intermediary 
agents were alien to the Ottoman state; whereas, in France, the 
situation was radically in reverse in the sense that cities 
and municipalities have developed as autonomous and self-gov­
erning entities.
The existence of the self-governing cities were common to 
all feudal societies. In feudal Europe, cities developed as 
self- governing entities through the process of feudal dissolu­
tion. Henri Pirenne in his influential book The Medieva1 
Cities pointed out that the cities in Medieval Europe were 
established against feudal authorities as a result of revival 
of commerce. Cities had their own law, and judicial institu­
tions were autonomous entities vis-a-vis the feudal authori­
ties. According to Pirenne, municipal institutions and munici­
pal democracy was developed by the spread of city councils in
11the twelfth century These councils were rudiments of the 
municipal institutions which informed the beginning of a new 
civilization. In France, these councils were established during 
the same period, beginning from the end of the eleventh century 
onwards. By the twelfth century most villages were both demo­
cratic and self- governing, run by a local assembly. These 
assemblies were composed either of all the local population or 
only a privileged portion of this population which elected
their own municipal officials. 12
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When king regained power, the autonomy of the localities 
was destroyed and after the fourteenth century there was again 
gradual increase in centralization. By the late seventeenth 
and early eighteenth centuries, the communal liberty decreased 
and under an absolute monarchy, society was administratively 
united to complete the political unity. Central government 
imposed a financial system to local municipalities which re­
sulted in a central supervision of local finance and end of 
municipal independence. This can be considered to a certain 
extent as the beginning of the tutelage. In 1692 monarchy 
abolished free municipal elections because monarchy saw it as a 
threat to the unity of the state. This monarchical structure 
was maintained until the French Revolution.
The Ottoman society, on the other hand, had no such 
tradition. Autonomous cities were alien to the Ottoman socie­
ty. There were also no classes that could challenge the power 
of the center. It has already been noted that all services were 
done by the servants of the sultan acting on his behalf. There 
was not a local government but a local administration totally 
under the control of the center. Therefore, in the Ottoxaan- 
Turkish context neither cities nor municipalities have de­
veloped as the institutions of civil society vis-a-vis the 
state. The establishment of municipalities was part of a 
modernization program imposed from above. The rationale behind 
the Municipal Law proclaimed in 1930 had some implications for
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the functions and the status of local government in the Turkish 
society. The Law declared that the existing municipalities 
could not conform and serve the intended modernization of 
Turkish society. The social engineers of the Tanzimat failed to 
recognize the political functions of local government in West­
ern Europe where local democracy was institutionalized at the 
level of local government. Although it was only at the end of 
the nineteenth century that some councils were established in 
Turkey, local government and decentralization acquired an 
increasing importance in France, beginning from the eighteenth 
century onwards. The history of decentralization began with the 
French Revolution of 1789 which has the greatest effects upon 
the later developments. It was Tocqueville who first recognized 
that at the beginning there was a push towards decentraliza­
tion, and at the end, an extension of centralization.^^
After the Revolution the French society witnessed count­
less debates on decentralization. Revolution gave power to the 
Jacobins and they formulated "equality" and "uniformity" before 
the law as primary concerns with regard to centralization 
indicating that "equality" and "uniformity" were possible only 
under centralization. On the basis of this rule they made a 
radical break from the ancien regime in the organization of 
royal provinces and parishes of ancien regime. The Jacobins 
created the departments and communes assumed that they were 
equal in size and importance. This was a rejection of the 
inequalities inherent in the previous structures and an attempt 
to institute local liberty.
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After the Revolution the social and political arena was 
unstable which reinforced the Jacobin elites to insist on 
centralization. Although in principle the Jacobins aimed to 
institute a democracy they continued to see local democracy as 
a threat to national unity. For example when the election of 
the president by popular vote was introduced and taken as a 
means to promote national unity, as of 1848, the popular elec­
tion of mayors continued to be seen as a threat to such· unity.
The rhetoric of national unity became a tool for the 
state elites to legitimize the subordination of local govern­
ment in France. When the local government decentralization was 
introduced, this was followed by a recentralization process due 
to the crisis which reinforced the prejudices of the central 
elites. But it must be noted that in the parliament there was 
always a group supporting decentralization and local democracy 
due to different reasons. In order to see what differs France 
from Turkey, it is meaningful to point out that the word 
"decentralization" entered the French political vocabulary in 
the 1820s whereas "centralization" in 1794.
In the middle of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman state 
was reinforcing its centralization, whereas in France, with the 
Revolution of 1848 and a short lived Second Republic, decen­
tralization was introduced for a short time, and the prefects 
were abolished at least in t h e o r y . A  new institution was
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created but this decentralization had a short life. Louis 
Napoleon intervened, and put an end to the efforts of decen- 
tralization. In the Third Republic, a new decentralization 
program was introduced by the Organic Municipal Law of 1884 
which gave the French local government system a form that has 
been at work-with the exception of some modifications- until 
the recent reforms of socialist decentralization. In this 
period, in the Ottoman society, local government institutions 
were novel and weak. The whole effort including the establish­
ments of local government institutions were directed to in­
crease centralization. The number of established councils 
remained limited to some centers, and many cities did not have 
councils.
When the Republic was established, it operated in a cen­
tralized fashion too. Although the institutions of local gov­
ernments gained legal status, they remained under the extensive 
tutelage control of the central government. In addition to this 
administrative control their financial resources have been 
limited, and this reinforced further their dependence upon 
central governments. The central government has been in a 
position that could easily intervene into the affairs of the 
local governments. Under this state of affairs financial de­
pendence gained a political character and central government 
used it to maintain local government bodies as the agents of 
central government in the periphery. Transition to multi-party 
politics in the 1950s did not change the nature of the rela­
tionship in question. The central approach limited its scope by
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the cost- effectiveness and efficiency without a real concern 
in local autonomy.
After the Second World War, the locil governments in 
Turkey faced serious problems due to high level of urbaniza­
tion. Since their resources were limited they could not over­
come these problems, and experienced many crisis. Needless to 
say, the most important one was of a financial crisis. Alloca­
tion to local governments was done by partisan considerations. 
During the 197 0s central government took over some of the local 
government revenue sources. In addition to this intervention, 
administrative tutelage became a serious problem when it was 
exercised over the mayors from the opposition parties. In 
France, on the other hand, local government during the same 
period reinforced its position. The share of local government 
expenditure within the national expenditure in particular has 
increased. Local government organizations successfully adapted 
welfare state policies which increased their share within the 
national public expenditure.^^
Another positive development in French local government 
system was related to the nature of the relationship between 
the prefects and mayors. After the Second World War, a kind of 
mutual relationship developed from which both the prefects and 
mayors benefited. Mayors and prefects have begun to work as a 
team for the benefits of their units. This mutual relationship 
gave mayors a greater freedom in their activities than the one
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that they were allowed by law of that time. In addition to this 
mutual relationship, local officials (i.e. members of the local 
governments) found some legal or illegal ways of bypassing the 
existing legal constraints. As Viven Schmidt claimed during the 
Fifth Republic, an examination of administrative processes in 
contrast to legal form indicates a quite different pattern of 
development in the center-periphery relations.^® The growth of 
informal channels of local power ensured that an informal 
decentralization existed alongside the formal centralization of 
the institutions. During the postwar period, France has under­
gone a process of economic and political modernization which 
has weakened the power of the state vis-a-vis private groups by 
tolerating them better than the previous periods. By these 
developments the attitude of the central elites has changed in 
favor of the periphery. This was one of the significant reasons 
that made decentralization possible.
At the beginning of the postwar period, there was a strong 
consensus that French society would be modernized. In order to 
accelerate socioeconomic modernization, the French statesman 
recognized that it was necessary to make an administrative 
reform. De Gaulle, in particular, aimed at direct relationship 
between center and periphery which would increase the speed and 
efficiency of the implemented state policies. Communes were too 
small for his aim, so that a new unity should be created. De 
Gaulle's aim was to create the regions as new administrative 
units, but the regional decentralization program failed because 
all local officials including the prefects and mayors resisted
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it, viewing it as a threat to their traditional career. Another 
reason for the failure was the opposition which was dominant in 
the periphery and resisted to maintain powev. What is important 
for us is that, unlike in Turkey, the debates on local govern­
ment in France concentrated on the change of existing structure 
and central-local government relations. Decentralization was a 
major political and administrative concern in the parliamentary 
debates in the postwar period. In Turkey, on the other hand, 
all problems of local government were reduced to fiscal and 
financial issues which meant that they were not political 
problems, in fact they were. For instance, the structure of 
central and local government relations which was the major 
source of problems could not be conceived as a reason of prob­
lems of the local governments in Turkey.
In Turkey, however, when central government was convinced 
that local government could play a role in the development of 
the country, neither decentralization nor central local rela­
tions became an issue of debate. Even in the short period of 
democratic municipality movement in the 1970s which has been 
explained in the third chapter, general outlook was to find a 
solution for the problems of the municipalities from the cen­
ter. Except for the democratic municipality movement, decen­
tralization and local democracy have not become a genuine 
concern of the central elites until the decentralization move­
ments of the 1980s.
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III. Local Government Decentralization in France and Turkey
The socialist decentralization reforms in France put an 
end to the last imperative of the French Revolution which was 
explained in the Jacobin principle of "uniformity". "The one 
and the indivisible Republic" was decentralized by the Law of 
1982. In fact, the socialist reform of decentralization was a 
radical break from the past and the republican tradition which 
takes national unity as a primary parameter in relation to the 
French state. It was a radical reform because it abolished 
prefects who has been the guarantor of "national unity". Since 
the French Revolution national democracy rather than local 
democracy has gained a priority as an end and has been seen as 
a guarantee for the unity of the nation which was a heritage of 
the republican tradition. It is, therefore, necessary to con­
centrate on the critical actors and institutions that have been 
barriers to the local autonomy and the development of local 
democracy. This is necessary not only to understand the nature 
of decentralization but also its differences from the local 
government decentralization in Turkey.
It has previously been noted that the critical actor 
between the central government and local government was the 
prefect who had a priory tutelage power over the local govern­
ment authorities. Since the Napoleonic era, the prefectural 
system has been at work as a way to ensure centralization. 
Despite the informal changes in the relationship between the 
prefects and mayors, the prefectural system has been a big
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obstacle in front of local autonomy. The radical part of the 
socialist decentralization program was the abolishment of the 
prefects. With the abolishment of prefects, all a priori 
tutelage disappeared. The departments and the regions gained 
their executive and the elected presidents of the departmental 
and regional councils became their councils' chief executive. 
This promoted local autonomy because the power of an elected 
member had increased vis-a-vis the centrally appointed members.
In Turkey, the local government decentralization started 
in a period when military government aimed to increase central­
ization and control over local governments by appointing offi­
cial members from the center as mayors.Although military 
authorities were motivated to reinforce the concept of the 
state, it marked the beginning of a new period for local 
government. The reforms of military government, however, were 
limited by the financial problems, particularly to solve the 
problems of the metropolitan areas which were mainly financial. 
They increased the revenues to a considerable amount and some 
productive resources were transferred to the municipalities.
More radical reforms came from the Motherland Party gov­
ernment which created a two-tier metropolitan municipality 
system and district municipalities in some metropolitan urban 
centers (Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir). The tutelage control that 
was previously exercised by the central government was trans­
ferred to the metropolitan municipality mayors. District 
municipalities are now under the tutelage control of the
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metropolitan municipality mayors. In comparison to France, 
decentralization in Turkey stopped at the metropolitan munici­
pality level and did not extend to district municipalities. 
While in France decentralization was a nation-wide program, in 
Turkey, metropolitan municipality mayor has the right to exer­
cise the tutelage over the district municipality mayors. Unlike 
in France, no one of the authorities, elected or appointed, has 
the right to exercise tutelage over other local authorities.
In Turkey, the primary motive behind decentralization was
the short-run political calculations of the Motherland Party
which directly did not aim to improve local democracy and
2 3 ·municipal autonomy. In France, in contrast, some pragmatic 
considerations were at work such as limiting the power of the 
Right in the periphery by gaining support and response for 
pressure groups. However, the primary motive, unlike in 
Turkey, was as J. Frears pointed out, "to produce what was so 
obviously lacking in the French of President Giscard's Estaing- 
some check and balance on the executive power of central gov­
ernment".^^ French central government intended to increase 
local democracy by giving local elected officials more 
autonomy.
The fact that decentralization in Turkey stopped at the 
metropolitan level does not mean that it was a failed reform. 
In general, the post-1984 metropolitan municipal system is a 
success story. New mayors conducted successful projects. 
Personnel expenditures decreased, whereas investment expendi­
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tures increased. But the problem lies in the relationship 
between the metropolitan municipality and district municipali­
ties. The rhetoric that district municipalities and metropoli­
tan municipality formed a "unified entity" does not guarantee a 
harmonious relationship between them. Moreover, the tutelage 
relationships between metropolitan municipality mayors and 
district mayors are not compatible with local democracy. Since 
they both are popularly elected, district municipalities should 
be given the same rights. They have better opportunities to 
establish relationships with people.This, in turn, increases 
local participation hence local democracy. Still, in Turkey, 
"requisites" for a viable political decentralization is lacking 
because the attitudes of the metropolitan mayors and the bu­
reaucrats constitute a major bottleneck. Although people have 
easy access to the district municipalities through formal and 
informal means, the district municipalities face the heavy hand
of the metropolitan municipal bureaucracy. 27
To conclude, the decentralization reform in France created 
a genuine local government system politically and financially 
independent from the central government, whereas in Turkey it 
remained at a much more partial level.
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CONCLUSION
In this study I have analyzed local government tradi­
tions and the post-1980 decentralization reforms in France and 
Turkey.
Local government decentralization reforms in France created 
a genuine local government system by which locally elected 
members gained the right and competence to decide on local 
issues. Before the reforms of the 1980s the greatest barrier to 
local democracy and local autonomy had been the prefect exer­
cising a priory tutelage power over mayors since the French 
Revolution. The Socialists abolished the prefectural system, 
and after the abolishment of the prefects all a priorv tute­
lages disappeared. Since the prefect was an elected member 
having a critical and influential role in the system, the 
abolishment of the prefects was a radical break from the tradi­
tion. Moreover, the reforms of the socialist government in­
creased the freedom and financial resources of the local gov­
ernment in France.
In Turkey, local government decentralization reforms of the 
1980s created a two-tier metropolitan nunicipality system in 
three major urban centers, particularly in Istanbul, Izmir and 
Ankara. The notable feature of the reforms is that after the 
reforms, local governments in general and municipalities in
particular gained new financial resources which in turn in­
creased their financial independence. By these reforms tute­
lage power which had previously been excercized by the ceiitral 
government was transferred to metropolitan municipality mayors. 
District mayors in the metropolitan municipality areas were 
placed under the tutelage of the metropolitan municipality 
mayors.
A crucial difference between Turkey and France regarding 
decentralization reforms is that the reforms in France created 
a genuine local government system and instituted local democra­
cy. Local councils have become local parliaments. In Turkey, on 
the other hand, decentralization reforms stopped at the metro­
politan municipality level and did not extend toward district 
municipality level. Still, local governments in Turkey are 
financially dependent upon the central government. Central 
government in Turkey has the tutelage power over municipali­
ties .
The above analysis lends credence to the hypothesis 
formulated that the extent and the success of decentralization 
in a country is closely related to its political culture espe­
cially to the extent that there has been a strong state. In 
fact, it is hard to understand the evolution of local govern­
ment in a society without reference to the state. In the 
polities where the state successfully penetrates the society 
by eliminating the elements of civil society, the local govern­
ment occupies a critical position for having the potential
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to challenge the power of the central government. The strong 
state places too great emphasis on the long term interests of 
the society by revoking a discourse on national and public 
interests. The local autonomy means, on the other hand, being 
out of the reign of central control and expression of the 
sectional interests vis-a-vis the general. Therefore, the 
strong state tends to be highly centralized in order to prevent 
the development of a polity in which sectional interests can be 
localized within a national context. Centralization is ensured 
by various administrative and political controls exercised as 
tutelage.
Both Turkey and France have a strong state tradition. Still, 
the state in Turkey has been stronger than in France. Two 
important factors weakened the French state, hence, led to a 
different pattern of decentralization. The first one is the 
existence of feudal tradition and the second one is the soci­
oeconomic and political modernization after the Second World 
War in France. In Turkey, on the other hand, the existence of 
a strong state and the absence of civil society have impor­
tant implications. In France, a case of decentralized feudal­
ism, there were peripheral forces challenging the power of the 
center, that is, continuous wars between the king and the local 
grandees in the ninth and the tenth centuries. In Turkey, 
however, center totally dominated the periphery which resulted 
in the total absence of the civil society. Within this context, 
cities in France began to take place representing the freedom 
and interest of a new class vis- a-vis the central authority.
whereas in Turkey neither such a new class nor the self- gov­
erning cities could be developed.
In France, the continuous conflicts on the nature of the 
regime, the foreign and colonial policy and the economic 
policies that need to be adopted could not be resolved with 
consensus even in the late nineteenth century and in the first 
half of the twenteenth century, thus, the state emerged as an 
autonomous agent setting ideological parameters. This explains 
why, since the Revolution, "national unity" has become an issue 
so crucial that any attempt at decentralization has been 
considered a challenge to such unity until the 1980 reforms of 
decentralization.
The evolution of local government in Turkey, on the other 
hand, followed a different path. It started as part of a 
general modernization process which aimed, in general, at the 
systematic penetration of the periphery. At the end of the 
nineteenth and early twent.eenth century, local government 
institutions remained artificial constructs in the Turkish 
society and the central elites treated them as such. The Repub­
lican version of central-local relations, despite the fact that 
a conceptual distinction between the central and local govern­
ment was made, did not change the status of the local govern­
ment in Turkey. The Turkish Republic was established at a 
critical time in which there were internal and external chal­
lenges to the new Republic. This further reinforced the nega­
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tive prejudices of the elites tov/ards the periphery. Therefore, 
the new Republic opted to operate in a centralized fashion. The 
basic central-periphery cleavage could not be resolved until 
the 1960s. Despite the fact that multi-party politics was 
introduced in the 1980s, the governments remained under the 
tutelage of the military and the bureaucracy. Until the Second 
World War, the local governments in Turkey did not become an 
issue of interest. But during the postwar period, the status of 
the local governments changed from being artificial constructs 
to being a natural part of the society thanks to high level of 
urbanization. But parallel developments could not take place in 
the minds of the central elites. In France, however, political 
decentralization, as a vivid notion in the political dis­
course, has a long tradition. It started with the French Revo­
lution 'Which embodied various attempts at decentralization. 
But as a result of the unresolved conflicts that has already 
been mentioned, the French state opted to act autonomously 
without giving the social groups an opportunity to articulate 
their interests. During the postwar period in France, the 
social and political modernization fostered the developments 
of the civil societal elements. They have become a common phe­
nomenon in French politics. The development of the interest 
groups in French politics fostered a change in the strength of 
the state. The state supported the development of such groups 
to accelerate political modernization. Moreover, the state in 
France aimed to narrow the gap between itself and the society. 
At the beginning of the 1970s the Jacobins who were the princi­
pal supporters of centralization became flexible in their
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interpretations of " The One and the Indivisible Republic", The 
principle which assumed that local autonomy was a threat to 
national unity lost its rigid content. Even many Jacobins began 
to think that decentralization was not a threat to national 
unity because the conditions that made it necessary in the past 
no longer existed. It was in this conjuncture in the 1980s that 
the Socialists found it easy to decentralize.
In Turkey, the local government remained under the strict 
control of the central government. Unlike in France, financial­
ly local governments have been weak and dependent on central 
government. Decentralization has not been an issue aiming at 
the creation of a genuine local government. Rather it has 
started as a result of short-run political calculation. All in 
all, it can be said that the political arena of the 1980s 
constituted a ground on which further decentralization could be 
introduced. Especially the balance between the state elites and 
political elites was in favor of political elites. Moreover, 
the state elites did not take the principles of "Ataturkism" in 
the rigid sense as it was before the 1980s. For example, de­
spite the principle of etatism which was an important component 
of "Ataturkism" they welcomed liberal economic policies after 
1980. Although the political conjuncture was suitable for 
further decentralization, it stopped at the metropolitan level 
and did not extend to the district levels because the primary 
motive was not to develop a genuine local government system. 
The state in Turkey is still a strong agent in eliminating
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civil elements. In regards to the interest groups, the Turkish 
polity represents a monist character. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that the extent of the decentralization reform 
stopped at a certain level.
A successful decentralization reform means that locally 
elected members should have the right to decide on local issues 
without prior permission of central government which means the 
abolishment of the tutelage. In Turkey, all tutelage power of 
the central government should be abolished to establish local 
democracy and local autonomy. Municipal councils and provincial 
local assemblies should be given the status of local parlia­
ment. Supervision should be left to the, people and the channels 
and mechanisms to ensure this supervision must be established. 
Still, the resources of the local governments in Turkey are not 
enough to fulfill their functions. Moreover, they are dependent 
on central government. Their dependency on central government 
is an obstacle to local autonomy and democracy because it 
limits their actions and flexibility. Local governments should 
be given the right to decide on local taxes which makes the 
people see the inevitable link between services and costs. This 
is the guarantee of the participation, involvement and supervi­
sion of the people. Throughout this thesis, it has been pointed 
out that strong state poses difficulties to democracy. In this 
context decentralization is not only a way to improve local 
democracy, but is also a way to improve national democracy as 
well.
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